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Be Paid to Play?
Lee Goldman*
I. Introduction
Amateur athletics at the major college level is big business. It is
marketed, packaged and sold the same way as many other commercial
products. Last year's National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA")
basketball tournament generated over $70 million in gross receipts.' Fi-
nal Four participants received direct payments of over $1.3 million.
2
Merely making the tournament earned invited schools almost $275,000.3
Football revenues were similarly lucrative. During the 1988-89 season,
bowl games generated $66 million, $53 million of which was distributed
to participating schools. 4 The sale of television and radio rights to regu-
lar season games provided additional income to NCAA member schools.
A successful college athletic program can also generate substantial indi-
rect revenues. Schools can convert their athletic programs' prestige and
notoriety into generous alumni donations and increased enrollment.5
Nevertheless, the NCAA prohibits payments, beyond educational
scholarships and specified expenses, to the athletes who are responsible
for producing those revenues. 6 NCAA rules also restrict the ability of
college-athletes to earn outside income.7 Thus, in a study sponsored by
the NCAA, football and basketball players reported having less money
available after expenses than nonathlete students.8 Almost fifty-eight
percent say the money they have is inadequate. 9 Many students are not
even provided the education that is promised them.'0
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit. B.A., Queens College of C.U.N.Y.; J.D.,
Stanford University.
1 See NCAA News, July 19, 1989, at 1, col. 4.
2 Id.
3 Id. These revenues may soar under the NCAA's new billion dollar contract with CBS Sports.
See N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1989, at 1, col. 5.
4 See McManus, Another Bowl for Miami?, Sporting News, May 29, 1989, at 61.
5 See G. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF AMATEUR SPORTS LAW 22 (1988); Jensen, Taxation, the Student
Athlete, and the Professionalization of College Athletics, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 35, 44 & n.39 (1987); N.Y.
Times, Mar. 31, 1989, at 47, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at 45, col. 1.
6 See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. The NCAA also limits the ability of students to
receive government assistance to fund living expenses. See infra note 335.
7 See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 140 (1989).
8 See CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF ATHLETICS, REPORT No. 1: SUMMARY RESULTS FROM THE 1987-
88 NATIONAL STUDY OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETES 32-33 (Nov. 1988) [hereinafter REPORT No. 1].
9 Id. Sixty-one percent of black and 40% of nonblack football and basketball players reported
they had less than $25 per month for personal expenses. See CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF ATHLETICS,
REPORT No. 3: THE EXPERIENCES OF BLACK INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETES AT NCAA DIVISION I INSTITU-
TIONS 20-21 (Mar. 1989) [hereinafter REPORT No. 3].
10 See, e.g., Gup, Foul!, Time, Apr. 3, 1989, at 54-60; Norton, .Vo Time For Classes, Calif. Law.,July
1984, at 46 (a survey of professional football players indicated that two thirds had never received a
college degree; similar results had previously been obtained for college basketball players). The
recent Norby Walters trial revealed some of the academic abuses occurring on college campuses. See,
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The NCAA's amateurism rules are ripe for review. It is inequitable
that student-athletes, who generate millions of dollars for the university,
must scrounge for basic expenses and struggle through their classes. It
is hypocritical for the NCAA to restrict payments to student-athletes
when its member universities continue to seek new ways of increasing
revenues, often at the expense of educational interests.11 The restric-
tions also are economically inefficient and result in resource misalloca-
tions. 12 Most serious, the technical and inflexible restrictions on
amateurism have resulted in inevitable rules violations' 3 which breed dis-
respect for educational institutions and damage societal values.
There can be no mistake-NCAA rules violations are rampant.
Fifty-seven percent of the 106 NCAA division I-A football members were
either censured, sanctioned or put on probation at least once during the
last decade. 14 Many more schools are guilty of undetected violations.
The infractions range from providing athletic shoes or game tickets that
are sold for cash,' 5 to the less subtle academic fraud or envelopes filled
with money. 16
Not only are universities' reputations sullied, 17 but the repeated vio-
lations create a climate of disrespect for rules generally. There has been
an outbreak of reported criminal activity by student-athletes. 18 Whether
this phenomenon represents an increase in crime or in its reporting, or
evidences a correlation between flagrant rules violations and disregard
for the law, 19 the fact remains that athletes are trained to view themselves
e.g., Notebook, Sporting News, Apr. 3, 1989, at 42. For example, Paul Palmer was certified as academi-
cally eligible to play despite flunking remedial reading four times, completing no classes in his ma-
jor, and taking courses such as bowling, racquetball, adjusting to a university, and recreation and
leisure. Id. The problem is more than anecdotal. Over 40% of black football and basketball players
at major Division I schools report having been on academic probation. REPORT No. 3, supra note 9,
at 44. The average GPA is under 2.2 and over one-third have GPAs under 2.0. Id. at 43. Of course,
athletes themselves share much of the blame for their academic difficulties.
11 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1989, at 44, col. I (A survey of college and university presidents and
deans found that eighty-six percent of those polled believe that the financial rewards of intercollegi-
ate atheletics are interfering with the educational mission of schools in the United States.); see also
infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 52-54, 345 and accompanying text.
14 See NCAA News, Feb. 14, 1990, at 4, col. 1; see also Gup, supra note 10, at 56, 58, 59; J.
TARKANIAN & T. PLUTO, TARKANIAN 361 (1988); J. ROONEY, JR., THE RECRUITING GAME 147 (1987);
M. TROPE, NECESSARY ROUGHNESS 76-77 (1987).
15 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1989, at 25, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1981, at 2S, col. 1.
16 See, e.g, Kilpatrick, Dodging a Bullet, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 29, 1989, at 24-34; Gup, supra
note 10, at 56, 59; N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1989, at 27, col. 2.
17 See, e.g., Gup, supra note 10, at 60; N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1989, at 27, col. 1. Even the Executive
Director of the NCAA, Richard Schultz, has opined that the public's negative perception of college
athletics mandates that the NCAA make "some drastic changes" in the way it functions. See NCAA
News, Jan. 10, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
18 See, e.g., Kirshenbaum, An American Disgrace, Sports Illustrated, Feb. 27, 1989, at 16-34; Es-
kenazi, Campus Crimes: Athletes Make the Wrong Kind of Headlines, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1989, at 40, col.
I. For example, during a one-month period at the University of Oklahoma, three football players
were charged with rape, another with selling cocaine and yet another with shooting his teammate.
Detroit Free Press, Feb. 19, 1989, at IE, col. 1. The University of Oklahoma has had the best on-
field record over the last 15 years and has twice been sanctioned by the NCAA.
19 See, e.g., Kirshenbaum, supra note 18, at 17 (following a 1986 survey of 350 colleges, the Phila-
delphia Daily News calculated that football and basketball players were 38% more likely to be impli-
cated in sexual assaults than the average male college student).
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as different and taught that rules and regulations are designed to be bro-
ken. A recent survey revealed that sixty percent of division I basketball
players "had no moral problem with taking money under the table." 20 Is
it any wonder that student-athletes similarly ignore societal rules? As Dr.
James Wharton, Chancellor of Louisiana State University, opined:
Virtually every student athlete who is recruited sees a series of
negatives about each institution by the time the process is over.
Things were done - a commitment was made for street money, an au-
tomobile was purchased or there was the assurance that, when they get
to the university, a way will be found to keep them eligible and they
need not worry about academics. Within the university, the fabric is
stretched and stretched, until it basically tears. And if, in the recruit-
ing process, the arrangements or agreements cause students to be cyn-
ical about the scholastic regulations - and everything else - then all
things are acceptable.
21
This Article argues that the NCAA operates as a classic cartel and its
amateurism rules constitute antitrust violations. Athletes' compensation
should be governed by the free market system. They should be paid ac-
cording to their fair market value.22 The elimination of the economically
inefficient amateurism restraints, particularly if coupled with enhanced
educational restrictions, 23 would lessen the inequity and hypocrisy that
now exists in college athletics and thereby help restore societal values
and respect for the rule of law.
The popular press has suggested that NCAA regulations may consti-
tute an antitrust violation. 24 No thorough antitrust analysis has ever
been provided to establish that fact.25 This Article fills that void. Part II
briefly describes the NCAA and its operation as a cartel. Part III pro-
vides a comprehensive antitrust analysis of the NCAA's amateurism re-
strictions. 26 It reviews and distinguishes the prior judicial decisions
discussing the NCAA's restrictions on payments to college athletes, ad-
dresses several threshold issues about the applicability of the antitrust
laws to the NCAA restraints, and thoroughly analyzes the reasonableness
of those restraints. Part IV discusses several "nonlegal" objections to
20 See D. HOFFMAN & M. GREENBERG, SPORTSBIZ 103 (1989).
21 N.Y. Times, May 19, 1985, at D22, col. I.
22 This Article does not suggest that all athletes should be paid. Many athletes, e.g., cross coun-
try skiers or archers, do not produce revenue for their universities. Their fair market value would
likely be less than the cost of a scholarship. The same might be true for marginal athletes in the
revenue producing sports. Moreover, a university could always independently refuse to pay athletes
if it believes such payments would be detrimental to the school's interests. It is the "agreement"
among horizontal competitors (the NCAA's member schools), not the amount of compensation, that
violates the antitrust laws.
23 NCAA educational restrictions, unlike the amateurism rules, do not violate the antitrust laws.
See infra notes 321-23 and accompanying text.
24 See, e.g., Becker, College Athletes Should Get Paid What They're lorth, Bus. WK., Sept. 30, 1985, at
18; Pro and Con: Should College Athletes Be Paid Salaries?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 23, 1985, at 56.
25 The most thorough antitrust analysis undertaken to date concludes that the NCAA restraints
do not violate the antitrust laws. See McKenzie & Sullivan, Does the NCAA Exploit College Athletes? An
Economic and Legal Reinterpretation, 1987 Antitrust Bull. 373 (1987), discussed infra at notes 59, 188-95
and accompanying text & 239.
26 This Article analyzes only federal antitrust law. State antitrust laws may be subject to differing
interpretations. See California v. ARC Amer. Corp., 109 S. Ct. 1661 (1989).
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the payment of college athletes. Some of these objections have merit and
may require legislative action. They do not, however, provide the NCAA
with a defense to an antitrust suit. Finally, Part V elaborates on the bene-
fits that would result from a free market approach supplemented with
enhanced educational restrictions.
II. The NCAA Cartel
The NCAA is a private, nonprofit association consisting of over 1000
members.27 Membership is available to academically accredited colleges
and universities located within the United States and its territories. 28
Regular members are classified into divisions to reflect differences in size
and scope of athletic programs.
29
The NCAA operates pursuant to a Constitution and Bylaws adopted
by the membership and subject to amendment by the members. The
Constitution, Bylaws, Executive Regulations and Official Interpretations
are published in a printed manual and distributed to all members.
30
Members are obligated to accept and observe the principles set forth in
the manual.3 1 A professional staff, located in Mission, Kansas and oper-
ating under the supervision of Executive Director Richard Schultz, exe-
cutes and enforces NCAA policy.
3 2
Organized in 1905, the NCAA's original purpose was to prevent the
escalating violence in college football from destroying the sport.33 Since
that time, the NCAA has expanded its operations and goals. In addition
to its supervisory functions, the NCAA conducts numerous champion-
ships, negotiates television rights,3 4 and controls the marketing of its
name and insignia. Budgeted revenues for fiscal year 1988-89 exceeded
$82 million.35 Despite its own growing commercialism, the basic, stated
policy of the NCAA "is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral
part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the
student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation
27 See NCAA News, Aug. 30, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
28 See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 8 (1989). Athletic conferences or associations and other groups
that are related to intercollegiate athletics are eligible for allied or associate membership. Id.
29 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 89 (1984). Division I includes between 200 and
300 schools with major athletic programs. Division II and III members have less extensive athletic
programs. Id. Division I is further subdivided into division I-A and I-AA for football. Division I-A
schools must meet designated attendance requirements and generally represent the more success-
fully competitive programs. See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 286 (1989).
30 See Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aft'd, 707 F.2d
1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aft'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
31 See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 8 (1989).
32 See NCAA News, May 24, 1989, at 3, col. 3.
33 SeeJ. FALLA, NCAA: THE VOICE OF COLLEGE SPORTS 15 (1981).
34 The NCAA controls the television rights to its own annually sponsored championships. The
NCAA's control over the lucrative television rights for intercollegiate football games was halted by
the Supreme Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
35 See NCAA News, May 24, 1989, at 5, col. 3. NCAA television revenues alone exceeded $57
million in 1988 and will more than triple under the NCAA's new contract with CBS Sports. See
Detroit Free Press, Mar. 31, 1989, at 46, col. 1; see also supra note 3. The NCAA also undertakes
noncommercial activities such as providing drug education programs and post-graduate scholarships
for student-athlctes. See NCAA News, May 24, 1989, at 5, col. 2.
1990]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
between intercollegiat athletics and professional sports."'3 6 To that
end, it has enacted guidelines for recruiting students,37 principles of am-
ateurism,38 limitations on financial aid,39 academic and other eligibility
rules,40 and restrictions on playing and practice sessions. 41
NCAA members, "employers" of student-athletes, compete with
each other for the limited supply of talented labor inputs. The competi-
tion is often intense. Literally hundreds of schools court the top ath-
letes. 42 Many people spend their money and time vying for the privilege
of signing high school stars. Recruitment of student-athletes requires
constant contact with the athletes and their high school coaches as well as
carefully planned campus visits.4 3 In addition, prize prospects often re-
ceive calls (and sometimes improper promises) from famous or wealthy
alumni .44
The NCAA's amateurism rules seek to restrain this competition
among its member institutions. In essence, the NCAA acts as a classic
cartel, eliminating virtually all price competition among its members. 45
"Compensation" for student-athlete "employees" is set by agreement
and is limited to tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-
related books. 46 The NCAA also has an extensive set of rules to ensure
that members do not increase athlete "compensation" indirectly through
awards, benefits or covered expenses. 47 Like most effective cartels, the
36 See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 1 (1989).
37 For example, the NCAA strictly limits the permissible inducements that may be offered a
recruit. See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 82-83 (1989). It also regulates the quantity of contacts a member
may have with a recruit and the period in which the contacts can be made. Id. at 69-82.
38 See id. at 57-67. An amateur student-athlete is defined as "one who engages in a particular
sport for the educational, physical, mental and social benefits derived therefrom and for whom par-
ticipation in that sport is an avocation." Id. at 57. The rules prohibit a student-athlete from receiving
payments for his or her athletic ability (beyond permissible financial aid) and from making any com-
mitment to participate in professional athletics unless the professional sport is different from the
collegiate sport in which he or she competes. Id. at 58-66.
39 See id. at 133-68. See also infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
40 See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 101-32 (1989). A freshman student must meet designated mini-
mum academic requirements to be eligible for participation in varsity athletics. Id. at 110-12. A
student must at a minimum be enrolled in a full-time program of studies, be in good academic
standing, maintain satisfactory progress toward a degree, and comply with all NCAA rules and regu-
lations to retain eligibility. Id. at 101.
41 See id. at 169-256. The rules limit organized practice activities, the length of playing seasons,
and the number of regular-season contests to minimize interference with the academic programs of
student-athletes. Id. at 169.
42 See J. Rooney, Jr., supra note 14, at 9.
43 See, e.g., id. at 37-72; 2 R. BERRY & G. WONG, LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES
xviii (1986).
44 See, e.g., 2 R. BERRY & G. WONG, supra note 43, at 8.
45 The NCAA also attempts to eliminate some nonprice competition. Recruiting practices are
extensively, if not altogether successfully, regulated. See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 69-99 (1989).
46 See id. at 136. Division III schools may also provide transportation and other expenses inci-
dental to attendance, id., but may provide no aid whatsoever except upon a showing of financial
need. Id. at 144. The NCAA also limits any scholarship aid to entering freshmen who do not meet
minimum academic requirements. Id. at 110-11.
47 Id. at 58-59, 62-63, 153-67. For example, there are limits on the number of complimentary
tickets issued players, id. at 158-59, and the quality of housing and meals that can be provided to
athletes. Id. at 161. Payments for summer jobs must be for work actually performed at a rate com-
mensurate with the going rate in the locality for similar services. Id. at 62. A school may not provide
transportation, e.g., a ride home with a coach, to an athlete even if the athlete pays for the appropri-
ate amount of gas expense. Id. at 164. The restrictions are seemingly endless. The NCAA also limits
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NCAA maintains an elaborate enforcement mechanism to monitor and
punish noncomplying members.48
The expected and actual market consequences of the NCAA's rules
are a reduction in the wages of student-athletes, greater profits for col-
leges, a transfer of income from low-income athletes to higher income
coaches, particularly talented recruiters, 49 inefficient forms of nonprice
competition among member institutions,5 0 and a misallocation of re-
sources that harms consumer welfare. 51
The NCAA "cartel" does not always operate smoothly. There is a
strong incentive to "cheat" on NCAA rules. Athletes' "wages," particu-
larly in division I men's basketball and I-A men's football programs, are
often below their fair market value.52 If an individual school pays more
than the NCAA allows, it may attract better athletes, larger attendance,
more lucrative television contracts, and greater national publicity. 53
Moreover, with in excess of 1000 members, and many "points of initia-
tive," 54 the school may justifiably believe that its cheating will go unde-
tected. Consequently, cheating appears rampant. 55 Nevertheless, the
rewards from cooperation are sufficiently great that NCAA members,
rather than abandon the "cartel," have reacted by attempting to increase
enforcement.5
6
the number of student-athletes that can receive "compensation" in the form of financial aid. Id. at
146-52.
48 See id. at 355-67; NCAA News, May 24, 1989, at 7, col. 1.
49 Talented recruiters can increase university revenues by bringing to campus student-athletes
whose value exceeds their cost. In effect, by eliminating wage competition for student-athletes, the
schools created competition for head and assistant coaches. The NCAA also seeks to limit that com-
petition by restricting the number of coaches that can be employed by Division I football and basket-
ball programs. See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 51-57 (1989). Those restrictions were acknowledged to
be "economy measures." See Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1153 (5th Cir. 1977).
50 The immense recruiting costs and the extravagant expenditures for state-of-the-art training
facilities and luxury stadiums are examples of inefficient nonprice competition for lucrative student-
athlete contracts.
51 See McKenzie & Sullivan, supra note 25, at 378-79. Because NCAA restraints suppress the
wages paid student-athletes, some athletes who would otherwise attend college will choose not to.
Not only does this create a noneconomic loss for a society that values education, but it necessarily
means that some athletes will employ their talents where they are less valuable than in college athlet-
ics. Id. at 379. The United State Justice Department also has recognized the wealth transfer and
resource misallocation effects of buyer restraints. See, Merger Guidelines Issued By Justice Department,
[Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1169, at S-1 (June 14, 1984); see also R. ECKERT &
R. LEMVTICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 470-72 (10th ed. 1988).
52 See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. Division I basketball and I-A football are the
primary revenue-producing sports.
53 See McKenzie & Sullivan, supra note 25, at 380.
54 A point of initiative is a place where one can buy, sell, exchange, or otherwise utilize the
property rights to a resource. See Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organization, 61 IND.
LJ. 9, 18 (1985). The greater the number of points ofintiative, the more difficult it is to maintain a
successful cartel. Id. The prevalence of alumni donors and other boosters increases the number of
points of initiative in college athletics.
55 See supra notes 14-16. Not surprisingly, the greatest number of NCAA rules violations occur in
the revenue producing sports - men's division I basketball and I-A football. See, e.g., Kilpatrick, supra
note 16, at 34.
56 The NCAA has greatly increased its enforcement staff during the last decade. See R. BERRY &
G. WONG, supra note 43, at 67. It has also strengthened its enforcement and penalty procedures for
member schools who violate NCAA regulations. Id. at 68; Kilpatrick, supra note 16, at 34; NCAA
News, May 24, 1989, at 7, col. 1. Enforcement alone, however, cannot solve the problems in intercol-
legiate athletics. See infra note 345.
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Despite the prevalence of NCAA rules violations, "cheating" has not
dissipated all of the monopoly rents member institutions gain by restrict-
ing athletes' compensation. Numerous athletes are still paid below their
fair market value. Many schools and student-athletes act scrupulously.
Given the NCAA rules, they choose to follow them. Even those schools
that act unscrupulously must pay athletes below market value to cover
the risk that their violations will be detected and punished. For some
athletes, their fair market value is so great that its payment could not
possibly go undetected. For example, it is believed that a Patrick Ewing
or Hershel Walker may increase direct revenues to the school by several
million dollars. 57 The intense recruitment pressures that the majority of
football and basketball players report experiencing 58 also suggests that
many student-athletes increase revenues by more than their "compensa-
tion." Finally, if schools now paid student-athletes their fair market
value, there would be no need for NCAA members to agree on financial
aid limitations. 59
Although there can be little doubt that NCAA rules restrain compe-
tition among member institutions, depress student-athlete compensa-
tion, and result in resource misallocation, it does not necessarily follow
that the rules violate the antitrust laws. Not all restraints of trade are
illegal.
III. Antitrust Analysis
The Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination . . .or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States." 60 Early on, it was recognized that the Act could not be con-
strued literally, since every commercial agreement restrains trade in the
sense that it binds the actions of the parties to it.61 Thus, the Supreme
57 See Koch, supra note 54, at 24. Star athletes may also indirectly increase revenues by creating
positive exposure for the school that increases applications for enrollment and alumni contributions.
See D. Hoffman & M. Greenberg, supra note 20, at xiv (1989), Jensen, supra note 5, at 44 n.39; N.Y.
Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at 45, col. I.
58 See REPORT No. 1, supra note 8, at 17.
59 Professors McKenzie and Sullivan argue that the assumption that college athletes are un-
derpaid mistakenly ignores that the expected pay of college athletes exceeds their actual pay by an
amount equal to the present value of future income from professional employment. See McKenzie &
Sullivan, supra note 25, at 380-81. They suggest that "[t]he fact that many athletes - including most
of the better athletes - voluntarily use up their college eligibility before 'turning pro' suggests that
their extra year or years spent in college sports provide valuable on-the-job training and media
exposure .... [resulting in] an increase in their expected lifetime income that more than compen-
sates for the loss of income during their college years." Id. at 381.
Even assuming that there were no restrictions on the ability of football players to enter the
National Football League's draft and that all college athletes went on to play professional sports,
Professors McKenzie and Sullivan's argument fails because it confuses athletes' subjective value with
their fair market value. If oil companies fix the price of gas, the fact that some people choose to buy
gasoline at the fixed price (i.e., have a subjective value for gas above the free market price) does not
mean that there has not been a restraint of trade. Quite simply, all individuals have the right to
expect prices set by the market, not by agreement, whether or not they are willing to accept the
agreed upon price.
60 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
61 See, e.g., Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also
Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1304 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aft'd, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th
Cir. 1983), aft'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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Court has ruled that the Sherman Act prohibits only those contracts or
combinations that "unreasonably" restrain competition. 62 Several re-
cent cases have addressed the reasonableness of the NCAA's restraints
on payments to student-athletes. 63 None of those cases, however,
presented a thorough antitrust analysis. Part A will discuss and distin-
guish those cases. Part B will address several threshold issues concern-
ing the applicability of the Sherman Act to the NCAA's amateurism
rules. Finally, Parts C and D will provide a comprehensive analysis of the
reasonableness of the NCAA's restraints on payments to college athletes.
A. Judicial Decisions
The leading case addressing the NCAA's amateurism restrictions,
NCAA v. Board of Regents,64 did not involve a challenge to those rules at
all. In Board of Regents, the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia chal-
lenged the NCAA restraints on the televising of college football games.
The NCAA negotiated television rights packages with the major net-
works and NCAA member schools were obligated to follow the provi-
sions in those agreements. The package limited the number of television
exposures any NCAA member school could have and effectively set
prices for the types of games the networks chose to televise. 65 The Court
affirmed the lower court decision finding the NCAA's restraints to be a
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. It reasoned that the NCAA
agreement restricted output, affected price and could not be redeemed
by any procompetitive purpose.66 The Court compared the NCAA's am-
ateurism restraints to the restrictions on television rights to illustrate
what might constitute reasonable restraints. The former, the Court sug-
gested, were necessary restraints that furthered the NCAA's essential
purpose. 67 The parties, however, neither raised nor briefed the legality
of the NCAA's restraints on payments to college athletes. The Court's
discussion was obiter dictum and unsupported by any careful antitrust
analysis.
Nevertheless, two subsequent cases relied on the Supreme Court's
dictum to reject challenges to the NCAA's amateurism restraints. 6
8
Neither case employed independent reasoning. In both cases, the price
fix challenge was not central to the case and was raised in a very unsym-
pathetic context.
In McCormack v. NCAA, an SMU alumnus filed a pro se complaint
against the NCAA challenging its suspension of SMU's football program
for the entire 1987 season. 69 The NCAA imposed its sanction after it
62 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
63 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Waiters, 711 F. Supp. 1435 (N.D. Il1. 1989).
64 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
65 Id at 92-93.
66 Id. at 113-20.
67 Id. at 102, 117, 120.
68 See McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Walters, 711 F.
Supp. 1435 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
69 845 F.2d at 1340.
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found SMU had repeatedly transgressed restrictions on payments to col-
lege athletes.70 The original complaint alleged that the NCAA suspen-
sion violated plaintiff's civil rights, the rights of SMU as well as those of
other alumni and constituted a group boycott in violation of the antitrust
laws. 71 Following a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, plaintiff
filed an amended complaint. Plaintiffjoined members of the SMU foot-
ball team and cheerleading squad and, for the first time, alleged that the
NCAA's amateurism rules constituted a price fixing violation.72 The fo-
cus of the amended complaint, however, remained the boycott allega-
tion. Plaintiffs wanted the court to enter an injunction that would enable
SMU to continue operating its football program, despite the NCAA's
finding of repeated rules violations. 73
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's
amended complaint. The court found that the original plaintiff and the
SMU cheerleaders lacked standing to pursue their claims, and ques-
tioned whether the football players were proper plaintiffs.74 The court
went on to hold that even if the players had standing, their substantive
claims lacked merit. Citing extensively from the Supreme Court's Board
of Regents opinion, the Fifth Circuit found the NCAA restraints reason-
able. 75 Finding the NCAA eligibility rules lawful, the court concluded
that enforcement of them through suspension or other restrictions could
not constitute an illegal group boycott.
76
United States v. Walters involved a criminal prosecution of two sports
agents charged with several crimes, including racketeering, extortion,
and mail and wire fraud. 77 The defendants were accused of secretly pay-
ing college athletes to sign representation contracts in violation of NCAA
rules and using threats of force to prevent athletes from reneging on
those contracts. 78 The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on
the ground that the NCAA's eligibility regulations violated the antitrust
laws. The court rejected the defendants' claims, relying exclusively on
the decision in McCormack and the dictum in Board of Regents. 79 A jury
subsequently returned a verdict against the defendants. 80
The context in which the parties challenged the NCAA's amateurism




73 Plaintiffs also sought damages for the alleged price fixing, group boycott and civil rights viola-
tions. Id. The largest award sought, a request for $150 million, was for the group boycott allegation.
Id.
74 Id. at 1341-43. The court's doubt on the player-standing issue suggests that the court also
viewed the complaint as primarily alleging an illegal group boycott. There is no question that players
seeking damages for a price fix would have standing to challenge a direct restraint on their
compensation.
75 Id. at 1343-45.
76 Id. at 1345. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' civil rights claims, finding the NCAA was not
a "state actor" within the meaning of section 1983. Id. at 1346.
77 United States v. Walters, 711 F. Supp. 1435 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
78 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1989, at 27, col. 1.
79 Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1442.
80 See N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1989, at 30, col. 1.
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McCormack and Walters less than compelling precedent. The language in
Board of Regents itself was unreasoned obiter dictum. Thus, future courts
should be free to apply their own thorough antitrust analysis in a case
directly challenging the NCAA's restraints on payments to college ath-
letes. This Article provides such an analysis below.
B. Applicability of the Sherman Act
The basic requirement for application of the Sherman Act is that the
activity in question involve or affect interstate commerce. 81 There is
some dispute among lower courts about whether a plaintiff must estab-
lish a nexus between the challenged restraint and interstate commerce,
or simply an effect on commerce resulting from the defendant's business
activities in general. 82 It is not necessary to resolve that dispute. The
NCAA restraints on competition for student-athletes satisfy both tests.
Athletes are recruited on a nationwide basis. The schools for which they
play compete nationally. Games are often telecast nationally. Tickets to
national championships are sold throughout the country. Thus, courts
addressing the issue have routinely found NCAA restraints to involve or
affect interstate commerce.83
An issue that has received more attention and been more vigorously
argued by the NCAA is whether the NCAA is involved in "commerce" at
all. The NCAA has maintained that the Sherman Act has been tradition-
ally applied only to commercial enterprises, not nonprofit organizations
pursuing noncommercial objectives.8 4 The leading case for complete ex-
emption of educational institutions from the Sherman Act is Marjorie
Webster College v. Middle States Association.85 In that case, a college sought
to enjoin enforcement of a rule denying accreditation to any but non-
profit organizations. Despite the serious impact of the defendant's rule
on proprietary schools, the court denied the plaintiff relief. It held that
"the proscriptions of the Sherman Act were 'tailored * * * for the busi-
ness world,' not for the noncommercial aspects of the liberal arts and the
learned professions."-8 6 Later cases have specifically cited Maijorie Webster
College to exempt the NCAA from the Sherman Act.8 7
A blanket exemption for the NCAA must be rejected. The court in
Marjorie Webster College limited its decision to restraints with incidental ef-
81 See McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex
Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976).
82 Compare Western Waste Serv. Sys. v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094, 1096-97 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980), with Furlong v. Long Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922, 925-
26 (2d Cir. 1983).
83 See, e.g, Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1150 (5th Cir. 1977); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F.
Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).
84 See Brief for Appellee at 19-21, McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-
2802); Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd, 707 F.2d 1147
(10th Cir. 1983), aft'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1148-49 (5th Cir.
1977).
85 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
86 Id. at 654 (footnotes omitted).
87 See Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975); College Athletic Placement Serv.,
Inc. v. NCAA, 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,117 at 65,267 (D. NJ.), aff'd without opinion, 506 F.2d
1050 (3d Cir. 1974).
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fects on competition that did not have an intent or purpose to affect the
commercial aspects of the profession.8 8 The NCAA's amateurism restric-
tions cannot meet that standard.8 9 More fundamentally, Marjorie Webster
College, Jones, and College Athletic Placement Service, Inc. all preceded the
Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.90 Goldfarb in-
volved an attack upon a bar association's minimum fee schedule. The
Court rejected the defendant's argument that the learned professions did
not involve trade or commerce. In sweeping language, the Court con-
cluded that there was no implied exemption for nonprofit organizations,
stating "Congress intended to strike as broadly as it could in Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, and to read into it so wide an exemption as that urged
on us would be at odds with that purpose."9 1 Following Goldfarb, courts
repeatedly have applied the Sherman Act to restraints imposed by non-
profit regulatory groups in general,9 2 and the NCAA in particular.9 3
Nevertheless, the NCAA might argue that a narrow exemption for
nonprofit organizations pursuing noncommercial purposes survives Gold-
farb. Support for this position might be found in Missouri v. National Or-
ganization for Women, Inc. (NOW)9 4 and Henry v. First National Bank.95 In
NOW, the Eighth Circuit held defendant's campaign for a convention
boycott of states that had not ratified the Equal Rights Amendment be-
yond the purview of the Sherman Act. In Henry, the Fifth Circuit sug-
gested that the Act might not apply to a civil rights group's boycott of
white businesses to protest racial discrimination by merchants and local
public officials. The NCAA could seek to distinguish Board of Regents by
arguing that the restraint at issue primarily implicated commercial activ-
ity, the regulation of lucrative television contracts.9 6 By contrast, the
NCAA would say, amateurism rules further strictly educational and social
goals, much like the restraints in Marjorie Webster College, NOW and Henry.
The Supreme Court's ready acceptance of the NCAA's amateurism rules,
albeit in dictum, might support this position.9 7
The NCAA's argument should fail for both legal and factual reasons.
The cases following Goldfarb that recognized an exemption for noncom-
mercial boycotts involved noncommercial entities pursuing first amend-
ment rights. The NCAA may be a nonprofit organization, but it is not a
noncommercial entity. The NCAA and its member institutions, when
presenting amateur athletics to a ticket-paying, television-buying public,
88 432 F.2d at 654.
89 See infra notes 104-06, 167-70 and accompanying text.
90 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
91 Id. at 786-87.
92 See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
93 See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136
(5th Cir. 1977).
94 620 F.2d 1301, 1312 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
95 595 F.2d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
96 See, e.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988).
97 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102, 117, 122-23 (1984); see also Justice v. NCAA,
577 F. Supp. 356, 383 (D. Ariz. 1983) ("[I]t is clear that the NCAA is now engaged in two distinct
kinds of rule making activity. One type ... is rooted in the NCAA's concern for the protection of
amateurism; the other type is increasingly accompanied by a discernible economic purpose.").
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are engaged in a commercial venture of far greater magnitude than the
vast majority of "profit-making" enterprises. 98 The NCAA has a multi-
million dollar annual budget, negotiates television rights to events it pro-
duces, and actively markets its product. Its member institutions appear
to constantly seek new ways of increasing revenues. 99 The Supreme
Court has recognized that the NCAA and its member institutions are or-
ganized to maximize revenues, 0 0 and the Division I Philosophy State-
ment itself acknowledges that each member school "[s]trives to finance
its athletic program insofar as possible from revenues generated by the
program itself."' 0 1 "[lilt is cavil to suggest that college football, or in-
deed higher education itself, is not a business."' 0 2 There is also no first
amendment interest proximately affected by the NCAA restraints.10 3 An
injunction barring agreement on the amount of compensation college
athletes can receive would not conflict with any protected speech (though
some wags might suggest that it would interfere with a religion).
Factually, one doubts that the NCAA restraints are solely motivated
by educational and social goals. Despite much support for stipends be-
yond scholarship aid for college athletes, the NCAA refuses to permit
such compensation.' 0 4 Richard Schultz, the Executive Director of the
NCAA, has conceded that financial concerns are the primary reason for
rejecting proposals to pay college-athletes a stipend. 10 5 College sports is
big business and the recruitment and hiring of college athletes is an inte-
gral part of that business. It stretches credulity to suggest that NCAA
members are unaware of, or are uninterested in, the substantial cost say-
98 See Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1149 n.14 (5th Cir. 1977).
99 For example, Division I-A football schools have begun plans for a national playoff. See N.Y.
Times, Apr. 26, 1989, at 45, col. 3. The playoff proposal is not motivated by a desire to determine
the number one school, much less to enhance education or preserve amateurism, but to increase
revenues. See NCAA News, May 17, 1989, at 4, col. 2. Money has motivated twenty-three division I-
A schools to form a consortium to link collegiate sport with corporate sponsorship. See NCAA News,
Sept. 11, 1989, at 5, col. 1. Even the U.S. Military and Naval Academies have yielded to that tempta-
tion. See Dunnavant, Army-Navy Game Seeking Corporate Touch, Sporting News, June 12, 1989, at 56.
Bowl games, of course, already have corporate sponsorship. See Dunnavent, Sponsors Use Clout With
Bowls, Sporting News, July 3, 1989, at 52.
100 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100, 101 & n.22 (1984).
101 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 282 (1989).
102 Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aft'd, 707 F.2d 1147
(10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); accord NCAA News, June 14, 1989, at 4, col. 1. The
Justice Department does not believe educational institutions are immune from Sherman Act review.
The Department has recently investigated whether elite colleges and universities have restrained
trade by setting similar levels of tution and financial aid. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
103 But see Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach, Intercollegiate Athletics and Television Contracts: Beyond Eco-
nomicJustifications in Antitrust Analysis of Agreements Among Colleges, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 717, 724 (1984)
(suggesting that educational values protected by the first amendment are implicated by NCAA rules,
although conceding that they are not so directly raised by television rules that the antitrust laws
cannot apply).
104 The NCAA has even eliminated the nominal $15 "laundry" stipend that historically had been
provided student-athletes. See D. ErrZEN & G. SAGE, SOCIOLOGY OF AMERICAN SPORT 230 (2d ed.
1982).
105 See Sunday Lincoln Journal Star, March 27, 1988, at ID, 4D; Sunday Omaha World-Herald,
Apr. 3, 1988, at IC, 4C. The NCAA has most recently appointed a Special Committee on Cost
Reduction to explore the merits of further restricting athletic scholarships to basic educational ex-
penses, augmented only upon a showing of need. See NCAA News, June 7, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
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ings the NCAA rules provide. 10 6 The Supreme Court's summary ap-
proval of the NCAA's amateurism rules' 0 7 is not to the contrary. Not
only were the Sherman Act implications of those rules not raised or
briefed in Board of Regents, but also the Court's terse discussion merely
suggested that the rules were reasonable, not that they were immune
from Sherman Act review.' 0 8 The nature and purpose of the activities
and rules of the NCAA are relevant to a determination of their legitimacy
under traditional antitrust analysis; they do not, however, support an ex-
emption from antitrust review.1 09
The NCAA might argue that even if it is engaged in commerce, its
amateurism restrictions do not restrain commerce. Several commenta-
tors have opined that restraints on the labor market were not intended to
be covered by section 1 of the Sherman Act or are protected by the labor
exemption contained in section 6 of the Clayton Act.' 10 A prior Article
has fully developed and criticized these arguments."'I Despite superfi-
cial support, legislative history, policy and judicial precedent all argue
against adoption of these commentators' position. 112 Workers (in this
case, student-athletes), like consumers, are entitled to the protections of
the Sherman Act."l
3
In earlier litigation, the NCAA also argued that its rules and regula-
tions were immune under the state action doctrine." 14 The state action
106 See supra note 105 and accompanying text; see also NCAA News, June 14, 1989, at 2, col. 3
(Frank Broyles, athletic director at the University of Arkansas and outgoing chair of the Division I-A
Athletic Directors Association, stated "the number one issue for I-A directors is cost containment.").
This Article does not suggest that the sole motivation of the NCAA is economic. The NCAA
engages in numerous worthwhile activities and enforces many laudable rules. Rather, this Article
only maintains that the NCAA amateurism rules are not solely motivated by social or educational
concerns. When a party is "at least partially motivated by the desire to lessen competition," no
exemption applies. F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768, 777 & n.10 (1990)
(quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 468 U.S. 492, 508, 108 S. Ct. 1931,
1941 (1988)).
107 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
108 Id.; see also 468 U.S. 85, 133 (1984) (White, J., dissenting).
109 See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564
F.2d 1136, 1149 n.15 (5th Cir. 1977).
110 See Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy: The Special Case of Sports League Labor
Market Restraints, 75 GEO. L.J. 19 (1986); Roberts, Sports League Restraints on the Labor Aarket: The
Failure of Stare Decisis, 47 PiTt. L. REV. 337 (1986); Jerry & Knebel, Antitrust and Employer Restraints in
Labor Markets, 6 INDUS. REL. LJ. 173 (1984); E. MILLER, ANTITRUST LAWS AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
94-112 (1984); Hoffmann, Labor and Antitrust Policy: Drawing a Line of Demarcation, 50 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 1 (1983); Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in
Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971).
Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing con-
tained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of la-
bor, agricultural or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help,
and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objectives thereof;
nor shall such organizations, or members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combi-
nations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988).
111 See Goldman, The Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws as Applied to Employer Labor Aarket Re-
straints in Sports and Non-Sports Markets, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 617 (1989).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 See Hennessey v. NCAA, 546 F.2d 1136, 1149 (5th Cir. 1977).
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doctrine immunizes conduct of private actors taken pursuant to state law.
The dual requirements for its application are 1) the private party must
act pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state pol-
icy and 2) the state policy must be actively supervised by the state. 1 5
The NCAA's rules and regulations satisfy neither prong. The Court in
Hennessey summarily rejected the NCAA's claim of exemption and the
NCAA has not raised the argument since. 1" 6
In sum, the NCAA's amateurism regulations satisfy the prerequisites
for application of the Sherman Act. The restraints are in, and affect, in-
terstate commerce, and there is no applicable exemption preventing
Sherman Act review. It is therefore necessary to determine the legality of
the NCAA's restraints under traditional section 1 doctrine.
C. Rule of Reason v. Per Se Rule
While the Sherman Act forbids only "unreasonable" restraints of
trade, "there are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable .... ,17 These types of ar-
rangements have been determined to be unreasonable per se and are ille-
gal without elaborate inquiry into the precise harms they cause or the
reasons for their adoption."18 By contrast, traditional "Rule of Reason"
analysis requires a consideration of the nature, purpose, and competitive
effect of any challenged agreement before a decision is made about its
legality."19
Antitrust plaintiffs have argued that the NCAA's restrictions on pay-
ments to student-athletes fall within the per se rule.120 The NCAA is an
association of schools that compete against each other to attract student-
athletes to their campuses. By agreement, they have eliminated all forms
of price competition among themselves. One purpose of the restraint
appears to have been and the actual effect has been to lower the '.'price"
paid student-athletes. 121 This is a horizontal agreement restraining
price, the paradigm of an unreasonable restraint of trade subject to per se
condemnation.1 22
115 See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
116 Recently, the state of Texas enacted legislation making it a crime to recruit student-athletes
with money or gifts. See Notebook, Sporting News, May 29, 1989, at 42. This legislation may serve to
immunize Texas schools from prosecution under the Sherman Act. It should not protect the NCAA,
other than, perhaps, to prevent students in Texas from having standing to sue the NCAA for future
violations.
Public universities that are members of the NCAA may be immune from suit in federal court as
state agencies. See hufra note 300. This too does not protect the NCAA. The NCAA is not a state
actor. Cf NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988) (due process challenge).
117 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
118 Id.
119 Chicago Board ofTrade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
120 See, e.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Walters,
711 F. Supp. 1435 (N.D. Il1. 1989).
121 See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
122 See. e.g., F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 58 U.S.L.W. 4145, 4148, 4151-52
(1990) (agreement among attorneys to cease representing indigent criminal defendants until the
District of Columbia government increased the attorneys' compensation held a "naked restraint"
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Despite its superficial appeal, the argument for per se treatment of
the NCAA's amateurism rules is inconsistent with modern antitrust juris-
prudence. Numerous Supreme Court decisions evidence a preference
for an efficiency-oriented Rule of Reason analysis.' 23 The Court has
been concerned that per se analysis may create overdeterrence that stifles
effective competition.' 24 The concern is especially strong where the de-
fendants lack market power.' 25 Thus, even if parties have "literally"
fixed the price of goods, courts require further factual inquiry to decide if
the challenged restraint should be characterized or classified as per se ille-
gal price fixing. 1 26 If the defendants can proffer any plausible justifica-
tion for their agreement that is not tantamount to arguing that the
Sherman Act should not apply to them, the court will reject per se analy-
sis. 127 It may be that on further examination the proffered justification
violating the antitrust laws); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 346-47 (1982)
(maximum fee schedule agreed upon by doctors for reimbursement for health services provided to
policyholders or certain insurance plans held per se illegal); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446
U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (agreement among beer wholesalers to eliminate short term credit to retailers
held per se illegal). The "rationale for per se rules in part is to avoid a burdensome inquiry into actual
market conditions in situations where the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct is so great as to
render unjustified the costs of determining whether the particular case at bar involves anticompeti-
tive conduct." F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4151 n.15, quoting Jef-
ferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16, n.25 (1982); accord, Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 344 n.14. Theperse rule also serves to clearly demarcate certain
types of prohibited conduct and thus affords business guidelines for structuring their affairs. See
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, Part !, 74 YALE L.J. 775,
832, 840-41 (1965).
123 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Board of Regents,
468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
124 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 16-25 (1979); Con-
tinental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-59 (1977).
125 If the defendants lack market power, a price agreement cannot affect the market. If the price
set is too high, consumers simply will buy elsewhere. The defendants eventually will be forced to
lower their prices. See E. SULLIVAN & J. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS 86 (1988). Accordingly, if rational defendants lack market power, it might be pre-
sumed that their agreement must not be designed to tamper with market forces, but to somehow
enhance their own efficiency and improve competition.
126 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979); Volvo N.
Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Professional Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 71 (2d Cir. 1988); P. AREEDA, VII
ANTITRUST LAW 423-25 (1986).
127 See supra note 123.
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), the Court, in a 4-3 decision,
labeled the agreement among defendant doctors as illegal per se. That label was misleading, however,
because the Court ultimately examined the defendants' justifications for their restraint and found
them wanting. Id. at 351-54. The Court also intimated that if the defendants had been pursuing
some ethical norm, formal adoption of the Rule of Reason would bejustified. Id. at 349. The Court's
analysis was fully consistent with the "quick look" analysis followed in F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) and NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). See infra notes
160-61 and accompanying text.
In Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980), the Supreme Court held that an
agreement among beer wholesalers to eliminate short term credit to beer retailers was per se unlawful
price fixing. The defendants attempted to justify their agreement as procompetitive by claiming that
it lowered barriers to entry and increased price visibility. The Court summarily dismissed these justi-
fications because such defenses would insulate even the most anticompetitive agreements from anti-
trust attack. Id. at 649-50. Without any cognizable justification, the defendants' restraint was
properly viewed as a naked price-affecting scheme subject to per se treatment.
The per se rule was applied most recently in F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 58
U.S.L.W. 4145 (1990). In Trial Lawyeis, the Court considered, but rejected, the defendants' first
amendment justifications for their refusal to represent indigent criminal defendants until govern-
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will be found illegitimate or achievable by less restrictive alternatives. In
that event, the challenged conduct can be condemned as unreasonable
under the Rule of Reason.' 28 Analysis under the Rule of Reason, how-
ever, creates the flexibility that ensures that actual market harm exists
before a court undertakes a rigorous second-guessing of the defendants'
actions. 129
The NCAA may present two broad justifications for its restrictions
on payments to student-athletes. It can argue that 1) noncommercial,
public interest reasons support its regulations and 2) its regulations are
procompetitive either because they are part of a productive joint venture
or because they enhance the image of the NCAA and improve the ability
of the NCAA to compete in the marketplace. Although this Article, after
close examination, rejects these justifications under the Rule of Rea-
son, 130 they are both sufficient to avoid application of the per se rule.
1. Public Interest Justifications Supporting a Rule of Reason Analysis
An initial inquiry is whether the Sherman Act recognizes
noneconomic interests. The Supreme Court recently has emphasized
that the goals of antitrust are economic efficiency and competitive mar-
kets.' 3 ' Noneconomic values are dismissed as beyond the ability of the
courts to balance. The Court has reasoned that the consideration of
noneconomic values requires "some ultimate reckoning of social and
economic debits" that is best left to Congress. 3 2
Absent actual anticompetitive effects, however, consideration of
public interest or other values neither requires the nebulous balance the
Court fears nor usurps Congressional power. Thus, the better view per-
mits noneconomic values to justify a Rule of Reason analysis, even if they
are not allowed to offset actual anticompetitive effects or serve as an
overall defense to liability. In this way, the per se rule can be avoided
where defendants further public interests without jeopardizing a compet-
itive marketplace.' 33 The case law is compatible with this position. The
cases rejecting noneconomic interests generally involved a finding of
ment-paid compensation was increased. Id. at 4149-52. Absent any first amendment protection, the
Court understandably viewed the explicit horizontal agreement, that affected price and was not part
of any productive joint venture, as a "naked restraint" subject to per se condemnation.
128 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Board of Regents,
468 U.S. 85 (1984); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
129 The Court does not necessarily require a full Rule of Reason analysis to determine that actual
harm exists. See infra notes 160-61, 166 and accompanying text. Thus, the policy basis's for the perse
rule, see supra note 122, are not sacrificed.
130 See infra notes 154-280 and accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986); NCAA v. Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 696 (1978); see also McKenzie & Sullivan, supra, note 25, at 391 n.44.
132 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963); accord Ford Motor Co. v.
United States, 405 U.S. 562, 569-70 (1972); see also Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust
Analysis, 87 YALE LJ. 655, 668 (1978).
133 If defendants lack market power, any agreement pursuing social goals should be legal. The
social goal prevents application of the per se rule and the absence of market power prevents a finding
of illegality under the Rule of Reason. For example, if a small athletic conference adopted any of the
NCAA's rules independently, the conference likely would not face Sherman Act liability.
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substantial harm under the Rule of Reason.13 4 Moreover, the contrary
view would be inconsistent with the Court's admonition that it is "unreal-
istic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other
business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust
concepts which originated in other areas," 135 and would place all regula-
tory associations in antitrust jeopardy.' 3 6 Although "good motives will
not validate an otherwise anticompetitive practice,"13 7 they should justify
actions that do not present an anticompetitive threat.
The NCAA regulations limiting payments to athletes can be justified
as promoting amateurism and education. 138 As stated by Justice White,
NCAA regulations "represent[ ] a desirable and legitimate attempt 'to
keep university athletics from becoming professionalized to the extent
that profit making objectives would overshadow educational objec-
tives.' "139 The NCAA's regulations may not be necessary or reasonably
tailored to accomplish this goal.' 40 That issue, however, is appropriately
considered when evaluating the NCAA restraints under the Rule of Rea-
son. The pursuit of educational objectives constitutes at least a facially
sufficient noneconomic justification demanding rejection of the per se
rule. 1
4
134 In Indiana Federation of Dentists, the Court said, "[a]bsent some countervailing procompetitive
virtue . . . such an agreement limiting consumer choice ... cannot be sustained under the Rule of
Reason." 476 U.S. at 459 (emphasis added). In Professional Engineers, the Court rejected the defend-
ant's public interest justification for its ban on competitive bidding stating, "the inquiry mandated by
the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that
suppresses competition." 435 U.S. at 691 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Board of Regents, the Court
found the essential inquiry to be whether the challenged restraint enhances competition under the
Rule of Reason. 468 U.S. at 103-04.
In F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 58 U.S.L.W. 4145 (1990) the Court dismissed
the defendants' social justifications and applied a per se rule. In Trial Lawyers, however, the restraint
undeniably affected price and was not part of any productive joint venture. Indeed, the social justifi-
cation offered, that higher fees would result in better legal services for the indigent, necessarily
required an effect on price. Thus, the real issue was whether the Sherman Act should apply to the
defendants' conduct, not whether Rule of Reason analysis was justified. Id. at 4149-52. If the Sher-
man Act was applicable, the defendants' agreement was unquestionably illegal under any mode of
analysis.
135 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975); see also F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n
of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
136 Ultimately, whether noneconomic values are recognized may be just an academic question. A
court wishing to consider noneconomic values can reformulate the justification as a procompetitive
one. For example, if the NCAA justifies its amateurism restrictions as pursuing the noneconomic
Olympic ideal, a court can consider this procompetitive justification by observing that the NCAA's
image and marketability may be enhanced by pursuit of that ideal. There is evidence that courts
already play this game. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
696 (1978)("Ethical norms may serve to regulate and promote . . . competition .....
137 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 n.23 (1984).
138 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 122 (1984)(White, J., dissenting); McCormack v.
NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988);J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAw OF SPORTS 768,770
(1979).
139 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 123 (1984) (White, J., dissenting), quoting, Kupec v.
Atlantic Coast Conference, 399 F. Supp. 1377, 1380 (M.D. N.C. 1975); accord, McCormack v. NCAA,
845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988);J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 138, at 770.
140 See infra notes 256-80 and accompanying text.
141 Promotion of educational values also furthers economic interests of the NCAA member
schools and therefore can be considered procompetitive. See infra notes 259-60 and accompanying
text.
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2. Procompetitive Justifications Supporting a Rule of Reason Analysis
Procompetitive (economic) justifications also can support Rule of
Reason treatment of the NCAA's restrictions on payments to college ath-
letes. In particular, the NCAA can argue that the restraints are part of a
productive joint venture and are ancillary to the NCAA's legitimate pur-
pose of promoting college athletics.
Antitrust law is designed to ensure an appropriate blend of competi-
tion and cooperation, not to require all economic actors to compete ab-
solutely at all times. When cooperation contributes to productivity
through integration of efforts, the Rule of Reason is the norm. 142 Thus,
courts have been especially solicitous of productive joint ventures 143 in
general and sports leagues and associations in particular. 44 They have
reasoned that in sporting enterprises, rules are essential if the enterprise
is to exist and compete in the marketplace and have therefore held the
per se rule inapplicable to all league and association regulations. The
Supreme Court specifically applied this body of law to the NCAA in
NCAA v. Board of Regents. The Court found the NCAA, through rules that
protect "the character and quality" of college football, "enables a prod-
uct to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable. In performing
[that] role, its actions widen consumer choice - not only the choices avail-
able to sports fans but also those available to athletes - and hence can be
viewed as procompetitive."' 4
5
The assumption that the NCAA or its restrictions on payments to
athletes are necessary for the production of college athletics may be chal-
lenged.' 46 Nevertheless, the NCAA "joint venture" does result in the
creation of some new products. The NCAA sponsors seventy-seven na-
tional championship competitions, forty-one in men's sports, thirty-four
for women, and two for mixed teams. 147 The popularity of its men's bas-
ketball playoffs alone attests to the productivity of the joint enterprise.
Although the NCAA's restrictions on payments to athletes may not be
142 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 16 (1979); Polk Bros.,
Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985).
143 The commercial law joint venture has been traditionally defined as "a sort of'temporary part-
nership' - dissolved upon the completion" of a particular business undertaking. H. HENN &J. ALEX-
ANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 49, at 105-06 (3d ed. 1983). In
antitrust law, however, it is not a term of art, see M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY & H.
GOLDSCHMID, CASES AND MATERIAL ON TRADE REGULATION 496 (1983); P. AREEDA, supra note 126, at
348, and has generally been applied to any research, production or marketing enterprise that main-
tains an identity separate from that of its parents. See Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1525 (1982); P. AREEDA, supra note 126, at 348-49; Roberts, Sports Leagues and the
Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 219, 247 (1984).
144 See, e.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988); Los Angeles Mem. Coli-
seum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390-98 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); NASL v.
NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1258-59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982); United States Trotting
Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, Inc., 665 F.2d 781, 787-90 (7th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Pro Football,
Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179-82 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d
646, 652-54 (5th Cir. 1977); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 618-21 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434
U.S. 801 (1977).
145 468 U.S. at 102.
146 See infra notes 224-33 and accompanying text.
147 See NCAA News, May 24, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
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"essential" to this productivity, the Supreme Court did not require such
a showing to justify Rule of Reason treatment in Board of Regents.148 It
was enough that some restraints, not the particular restraint challenged,
were essential if the product was to be produced at all.' 49 The NCAA
easily meets that test.
The NCAA also serves a useful marketing function, much like a trade
association. It seeks to improve the image and enhance the consumer
appeal of college sports. The restrictions on payments to college ath-
letes may be justified as ancillary to this legitimate purpose. °5 0 NCAA
rules are said to promote competitive balance and thereby further the
public's interest in existing contests.' 5 ' Without these restrictions, it is
predicted that one or a few teams will purchase all the star players and
dominate on-field competition. The quality of athletic competition and
hence fan appeal would suffer. Although the assumptions made about
the stabilizing effects of restraints on payments to college athletes are
subject to challenge, 152 the Supreme Court's ready acceptance of the
competitive balance argument' 5 3 suggests that it is at least a plausible
justification for Rule of Reason treatment.
In sum, NCAA restraints plausibly further valued noneconomic in-
terests, are part of a productive joint venture and are arguably reason-
able ancillary restraints. This justifies application of the Rule of Reason,
rather than the per se rule.
148 Restraints on the marketing of television rights surely are not essential to the production of
college sports, yet the Court found the Rule of Reason applicable.
149 468 U.S. at 101. Earlier joint venture cases could be construed to require a showing that the
challenged restraint is essential or necessary to market the joint product. See, e.g., Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356 (1982). Those cases, however, are more appropriately interpreted as hold-
ing that such a showing justifies legality, not merely analysis, under the Rule of Reason. If a restraint
is truly necessary for a productive joint venture, the restraint must have net procompetitive effects.
More troubling was the Supreme Court's failure to require some nexus between the challenged
restraint and the joint enterprise's productive activities. For example, if a trade association adopted
an explicit price fix, the Court's opinion seemingly would allow the association to avoid a per se rule
merely by proffering the procompetitive functions the trade association performs. Perhaps the Court
assumes that such problems easily can be handled by its "quick look" Rule of Reason analysis. See
infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
150 An ancillary restraint is a collateral part of a larger procompetitive endeavor whose efficiency
it enhances. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 229 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189
(7th Cir. 1985); Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 990 (1984). Also, ancillary restraints cause otherwise per se unlawful conduct to be tested
under the Rule of Reason. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d
210, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A.,
Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 599-604 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest
City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985); Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726
F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). For a discussion of the history and develop-
ment of the ancillary restraints doctrine, see Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Anti-
trust, The Rule of Reason, and the Doctrine ofAncillay Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 943, 992-1015 (1988).
151 See, e.g., Brief of Appellee at 23, McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-
2802);J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 138, at 770.
152 See infra notes 246-55 and accompanying text.
153 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 at 117, 119 (1984).
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D. Rule of Reason Analysis
The broad contours" of a Rule of Reason analysis were first articu-
lated in 1918 in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.154
This has remained the general statement of the Rule of Reason stan-
dard, although recently the Supreme Court has sharpened the required
focus. In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, the Court
indicated that contrary to its name, the Rule of Reason "does not open
the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged
restraint that may fall within the realm of reason."' 55 Rather, the focus
must be on the "market impact" of the challenged restraint.1 56 This has
typically required a two-fold inquiry. 157 First, the restraint's effect in a
relevant market must be identified. Often, but not always, this will re-
quire determination of a relevant product and geographic market.158
Second, the procompetitive justifications for the challenged practice
must be analyzed. An apparently anticompetitive restraint can be re-
deemed only if it is the least restrictive alternative, or at least reasonably
necessary, to further a legitimate purpose.'5 9
A court's ultimate conclusion about a restraint's competitive impact
may involve some balancing of the practice's anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects. Frequently, however, the reasonableness equa-
tion does not require extensive analysis. Where the harm resulting from
a restraint is clear, and the benefits dubious or minor, it may be con-
demned without establishing market power or making detailed find-
ings. 160 This so-called "quick look" or "truncated Rule of Reason"
analysis provides flexibility to consider the defendant's proffered justifi-
cations without necessarily sacrificing the litigation cost savings and busi-
ness predictability that a per se rule provides.'
6 1
154 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
155 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
156 Id. at 690, 692.
157 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Board of Regents,
468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
158 See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
159 See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); see also P. AREEDA, supra note 126, at 403-04.
160 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986); NCAA v. Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 & n.39 (1984); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 692 (1978); see also P. AREEDA, supra note 126, at 398, 403.
161 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "there is often no bright line separating per se
from Rule of Reason analysis." NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984).
"[Wihether the ultimate finding is the product of presumption or actual market analysis, the essen-
tial inquiry remains the same - whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition." Id. at
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This Article views the NCAA's restraints on payments to college ath-
letes as susceptible to this form of truncated analysis. The restraint on
competition is clear and the restraints do not or are not necessary to
further a procompetitive purpose. The bases for these conclusions are
detailed below.
1. Market Effect of the Challenged Restraints
The character of the market(s) in which the parties operate, the par-
ties' market shares, and the behavior and shares of their competitors usu-
ally determine whether a threat to competition has or will come to pass
and whether such impact is likely to be significant. 16 2 Cooperative pro-
duction cannot threaten competition or consumer welfare unless those
who participate possess market power - that is "the power to control
prices or exclude competition."' 163 Without market power, the parties'
agreement will face the discipline of the marketplace. 16 4 Because it is
often difficult to measure market power directly, it is generally necessary
to define a market and to determine the parties' share in that market. A
substantial share is the basis for inferring market power.
Nevertheless, the ultimate inquiry under either the Rule of Reason
or the per se rule remains whether competition has been or could be af-
fected. 16 5 If prices have been raised above the competitive level, there is
no reason to inquire whether proxies for effects on competition have
been established. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that it is not neces-
sary to define a market or establish market power if actual effects on com-
petition are proved. 16 6 "Quick look" analysis is sufficient to condemn
the challenged restraint.
The NCAA's restrictions on college athletes appear to be an agree-
ment for which "no elaborate study of the industry is" required. 67 One
can take judicial notice of the collective power of NCAA member institu-
tions over current and prospective student-athletes. The NCAA rules
college sports. NCAA regulations directly restrain price competition and
104. The "quick look" or "truncated Rule of Reason" review merely constitutes the middle ground
in the continuum of antitrust analysis.
162 See P. AREEDA, supra note 126, at 376.
163 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
164 See supra note 133.
165 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 104.
166 See F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986); NCAA v. Board of Regents,
468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984). Taken literally, the Court's statement is problematic. It is impossible to
show an effect on competition unless the "competition" has been defined. For example, if three
sellers establish a joint advertising program, prices in their advertisements may stabilize prices
among the three of them. But, unless they are a well-defined market, there may not be an effect on
competition. More generally, any agreement restricts the freedom of those agreeing. That is only a
concern if they constitute a significant part of a relevant market. The proper interpretation of the
Court's statement therefore must be that precise definition of a relevant market is not necessary.
Courts may interpret the record in light of common knowledge or assumptions about the economy
generally and the defendant's market in particular. See F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S.
at 459; NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109 n.39; see also P. AREEDA, supra note 126, at 403.
TIhose assumptions can be particularly broad when no procompetitive justification is evident. See
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 110 n.42.
167 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); NCAA v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984).
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result in compensation below fair market levels.168 The NCAA also lim-
its the number of students that can be given financial aid.169 Actual ef-
fects on the competition for student-athletes' services are apparent and
there is evidence that such effects were intended.
70
A more precise market definition only substantiates the NCAA's
market power. Formal definition of the NCAA's market share requires
definition of a relevant product and geographic market. The focus of
both inquiries is upon the ability of consumers and suppliers to substi-
tute other goods or services for the product the NCAA members offer or
purchase. 7
1
The NCAA has almost complete monopsony power over the stu-
dent-athlete labor market for men's division I basketball and division I-A
football. The student-athlete generally has no adequate substitute for
participation in either sport.
. The NCAA might argue that men's division I basketball and division
I-A football or "big-time" college sports are not well-defined products
because the market definition excludes the broad entertainment industry,
professional sports, minor NCAA divisions and other athletic associa-
tions,' 72 as well as other NCAA sports. Each of these, the NCAA could
argue, offers alternatives to participation in big-time college athletics to
student-athletes. These arguments do not undermine a finding of mar-
ket power.
There can be some dispute concerning whether the NCAA competes
in a general entertainment market for fan or television revenues. 73
There cannot be a broad entertainment market, however, for restraints
on the student-athlete labor market. Neither prospective student-ath-
letes nor colleges perceive acting or other types of entertainment careers
as substitutable for participation in college athletics; different skills must
be developed for each endeavor; Hollywood studios simply do not re-
cruit star high school athletes as colleges do; and the salaries in the broad
entertainment industry and college athletics are very different.
A market including professional sports is slightly more persuasive.
At some level, college athletics can already be considered profes-
sional. 174 Nevertheless, for most student-athletes, professional sports
are not an adequate substitute for college athletics, at least for the reve-
nue producing team sports of basketball and football. First, for the many
athletes who want the combination of sports and an education, profes-
sional sports is not an adequate substitute for college athletics. 75 Sec-
168 See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
169 See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 137-42 (1989).
170 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
171 For a detailed discussion of factors relevant to market definition, see The Department ofJus-
tice Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984); P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMp, ANTITRUST LAW
392-465 (Supp. 1988).
172 The National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) and the National Little College
Athletic Association (NLCAA) regulate college athletics among many smaller colleges.
173 See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 132 (White, J., dissenting).
174 See infra notes 260-71 and accompanying text.
175 Student-athletes engaging in individual sports such as tennis might be able to create their own
professional athletics schedule while enrolled in college. For them, professional sports might be an
1990]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ond, the professional leagues, particularly the National Football League,
have rules restricting the recruitment of athletes before their college eli-
gibility expires.' 76 For those sports, the professional leagues are not a
ready alternative to college athletics. Third, the vast majority of recruits
do not have the talent to succeed in the professional leagues at the time
they enter college. Professional sports is not a realistic alternative for
them. The present de minimis number of high school athletes directly em-
barking upon professional basketball or football careers attests to the
nonsubstitutability of those college and professional sports. 17 7 More-
over, even if professional athletes were included in the market, the small
number of professionals relative to college athletes still would leave the
NCAA with substantial market power.'
78
The exclusion of less competitive NCAA divisions and other athletic
associations is easily justified. Those divisions do not maintain the bud-
gets or provide the exposure necessary to compete with the major col-
lege teams for recruitment of star athletes.' 7 9 Neither students, nor
broadcasters nor the public view those schools as competitive with major
division I schools. The district court in Board of Regents implicitly found
that such schools could not compete with division I universities. 8 0  In
any event, many members of the smaller athletic associations are also
members of the NCAA. Those schools, as well as all schools in NCAA
division II and division III, are subject to NCAA regulations and control.
They cannot offset NCAA power. 18 1
Defining separate markets for each sport is also justified. Although
some athletes are gifted in more than one sport, the vast majority special-
adequate substitute for college athletics. This alternative is not feasible for football or basketball
players. They would not be able to calendar their own events and the professional team schedule
would unduly conflict with their classes.
176 Professional baseball commonly drafts high school players. A men's baseball market therefore
might more reasonably include professional sports. Professional leagues also offer some competi-
tion for upperclassmen in both of these revenue producing sports.
177 A few basketball players have entered the NBA directly from high school. Nevertheless, the
number is so small as to be statistically insignificant. See Weistart, LegalAccountability and the NCAA, 10
J.C.U.L. 167, 174 (1983-84). No high school football player has directly entered the National Foot-
ball League in modern times.
178 This would not be true, however, if all levels of professional athletes were included. For exam-
ple, although the National Basketball League has only 324 (12 x 27) players, addition of the players
in the Continental Basketball League and European Leagues increases that number substantially.
Those leagues, however, might be excluded because they do not offer the same exposure or money
as the National Basketball Association and "big-time" NCAA competition. Cf International Boxing
Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959)(champion boxing events constitute a market separate
from that for nonchampionship events). Foreign leagues also limit the number of American players
permitted on each team's roster. See Detroit Free Press, Aug. 11, 1989, at 2F, col. 1.
179 Cf International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959); see also NCAA v. Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. at 111-12. Of course, some star athletes attend minor division schools. The vast
majority, however, do not. Substitution at the margins does not justify inclusion in the market.
180 The district court found that the NCAA's restrictions on the sale of television rights reduced
output even though division II and III schools were not subject to those restrictions. Board of Re-
gents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1290 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983),
aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). If all divisions were in the same market, an increase in output by schools in
the unrestricted divisions would have offset any reduction of output by division I universities.
181 The argument that minor associations may begin to compete by paying athletes is addressed
infra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
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ize. i8 2 The BoJacksons of the world, who can play professional football
as a "hobby," are rare. Not only are the skills required for each sport
different, but the participants' and spectators' perceptions of them are
different. Thus, both supply-side and demand-side considerations mili-
tate against inclusion of other sports in the market. Cases challenging
restraints on athletes and teams in professional sports have implicitly rec-
ognized each sport as a separate market.1 83 Moreover, the issue just may
be academic because the NCAA governs all college sports.1 84
Geographic market definition presents no real issues. Schools re-
cruit nationally and student-athletes attend universities throughout the
country. 18 5 A national market seems appropriate. A narrower market
definition, however, would not undermine the finding that the NCAA
possesses market power. The NCAA is the dominant force in college
athletics in every region and locality in the country. A broader interna-
tional market, on the other hand, is not proper. Few athletes attend uni-
versities outside the United States.
Despite the apparent effects on competition and the NCAA's virtual
monopsony over the labor market for men's division I basketball and di-
vision I-A football, Professors McKenzie and Sullivan, in their thought-
provoking article, question whether the NCAA really has market power.
They argue that it is not feasible for the over 800 NCAA members to
maintain agreement and that even if they could, the absence of barriers
to entry prevent the member institutions from effectively exercising
market power.' 86 They suggest that "if the NCAA seriously depressed
athletes' wages, the temptation of member colleges to drop their mem-
bership and form another association that permitted competitive wage
payments would be overwhelming. '"187
There is no question that the sheer number of NCAA members
makes the NCAA cartel operate imperfectly.188 Numbers alone, how-
ever, do not prevent an effect on competition. An elaborate enforcement
mechanism, costly penalties and the benefits of NCAA membership pre-
vent complete departure from the NCAA agreement. Professors McKen-
zie and Sullivan are correct that maintaining an effective cartel among
850 members in other industries would be difficult or impossible. 18 9
Other industries, however, have difficulty policing and enforcing their
agreements because they must keep their conspiracy secret. When se-
182 To the extent athletes have the skills to excel in multiple sports, the greater potential profes-
sional earnings of basketball and football already channel those athletes to division I basketball and
division I-A football. Therefore, payments to college basketball and football players would not cause
significant changes in the supply of multi-skilled student-athletes to those sports.
183 See, e.g., USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d
1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801
(1977); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D. N.Y. 1975); Philadelphia World Hockey Club,
Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
184 But see supra notes 175-76.
185 See J. ROONEY, JR., supra note 14, at 97-117.
186 McKenzie & Sullivan, supra note 25, at 384-87.
187 Id. at 386.
188 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
189 McKenzie & Sullivan, supra note 25, at 385 n.19.
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crecy is not required, courts have often found successful conspiracies
among large numbers of defendants. 190
Professors McKenzie and Sullivan are also correct that absent barri-
ers to entry by competing associations, the NCAA would not have effec-
tive market power. Their assumption that no barriers to entry exist,
however, depends upon too static an approach to market analysis. Seces-
sion by an individual member/university, of course, would be ineffective.
A successful secession movement would require a large number of
schools to leave the NCAA simultaneously - a number the district court
in Board of Regents found "prohibitively high."191 The schools must agree
on a variety of rules, not just on payments to athletes. Until agreement
could be reached, they would risk suffering the wrath of the NCAA. The
withdrawing (or expelled) members would likely find it impossible to
sponsor a well-rounded sports program. For example, if members of the
College Football Association (CFA)192 attempted to form their own pay-
ing football conference, they would have to forfeit the right to participate
in all other NCAA sports. In particular, they would lose the right to take
part in, and share the revenues from, the lucrative NCAA basketball
championship. The seceding members would also lose the many non-
commercial benefits offered by the NCAA. The experience with the
CFA's television contract is illustrative. When the CFA signed a contract
with NBC, the NCAA announced that it would take disciplinary action
against any team that complied with the CFA-NBC contract. The NCAA
"made it clear that sanctions would not be limited to the football pro-
grams of the CFA members, but would apply to other sports as well."'
9 3
As a result, most CFA members were unwilling to commit themselves to
the new contractual arrangement with NBC and the agreement was not
consummated. 194 Furthermore, the long-range financial projections of
the prospective competing association do not seem as rosy as Professors
McKenzie and Sullivan suggest. There is currently an entrenched prefer-
ence for NCAA sports. The competing association would have to pay
student-athletes more than the NCAA pays to overcome that preference.
It is difficult to imagine that all star athletes would select a NAIA team
over a Notre Dame overnight. If the competing association began to
constitute a threat to the NCAA's popularity and superiority, NCAA
members could vote to begin making competing payments. The smaller
associations would remain competitively inferior, but would incur signifi-
cantly greater costs than they now incur. Schools or existing associa-
190 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); In the Matter of American
Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), aff'd sub norn. AMA v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd by
an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
191 Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd, 707 F.2d 1147
(10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); see also Koch, supra note 54, at 23.
192 The CFA is an association of five leading conferences and major football-playing independent
institutions organized to promote the interests of "big-time" football-playing schools within the
NCAA structure. See Board of Regents v. NCAA, 468 U.S. 85, 89.
193 Id. at 95.
194 Id. Of course, after the Supreme Court held the NCAA's television plan violated the Sherman
Act, the CFA members no longer had to fear NCAA discipline if they signed their own television
contract.
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tions, aware of this dynamic, would be reluctant to incur short term costs
for what would appear to be uncertain, if not doubtful, long run gain.
Thus, as the district court in Board of Regents concluded, "formation of a
rival organization is neither practical, feasible nor desirable." 195
In 1982, the district court in Board of Regents referred to the NCAA as
a monopolist of college athletics. 96 Nothing has changed since that
time. The NCAA amateurism rules directly regulate price competition
and both a "quick look" and detailed market analysis demonstrate that
the NCAA has the power to affect competition. Absent some convincing
procompetitive justification, the NCAA restrictions on payments to col-
lege athletes should be found illegal under the Rule of Reason.
2. Justifications for the Challenged Restraints
The NCAA's historic role in preserving collegiate athletics justifies a
presumption of validity for its motives.' 97 Good motives alone, however,
cannot justify an otherwise anticompetitive practice.' 98 Where actual ef-
fects on competition have been demonstrated, every defendant, includ-
ing the NCAA, has "a heavy burden" of establishing a procompetitive
justification for the deviation from the operations of a free market. 199 No
longer is it sufficient to proffer a mere "plausible" procompetitive pur-
pose.200 The defendant must persuade the court that the challenged re-
straint furthers a legitimate goal, and that less restrictive means are not
available to accomplish the same purpose.20 ' The rigor with which the
defendant's asserted justifications are analyzed and questioned increases
with the seriousness of the anticompetitive harm.20 2 When, as with the
NCAA's restrictions on payments to college athletes, a direct restraint on
price appears evident, only the most convincing showing of necessity
195 Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aft'd, 707 F.2d 1147
(10th Cir. 1983), aft'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
196 Id; see also Weistart, supra note 177, at 171-74 (describing the NCAA as a "monolithic" entity
that controls major collegiate sports).
197 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101 n.23; but see, infra note 203 and accompanying
text.
198 468 U.S. at 101 n.23.
199 Id at 113.
200 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
201 See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 115 n.56, 116, 119; Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 352-53, 356-57 (1982); see also P. AREEDA, supra note 126, at
383-84. Less restrictive alternative analysis is a matter of degree. As Professor Areeda suggests, if an
industry with 20 members undertakes four research joint ventures with five firms in each venture, its
procompetitive justification will not be dismissed merely because five ventures with four firms each
could have achieved the same results. P. AREEDA, supra note 126, at 388. A different conclusion
might be reached, however, if all 20 firms formed the joint venture. In short, less restrictive alterna-
tive analysis requires discriminating judgment about the magnitude of harm caused by the chal-
lenged restraint, the degree by which an alternative could have lessened that harm, the extent to
which adoption of the alternative would have sacrificed procompetitive efficiencies, and the ease with
which the alternative could have been employed.
202 See, e.g., In the Matter of American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 1004 (1979); aft'd, 638 F.2d
443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982); see also P. AREEDA, supra note
126, at 402;J. Weistart & C. Lowell, supra note 138, at 770. This "sliding scale" approach reflects the
balancing process that is central to the Rule of Reason.
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should justify the otherwise unreasonable restraint. 20 3 The NCAA's am-
ateurism rules cannot satisfy that heavy burden.
The NCAA and commentators have argued for, and courts have
cited, five basic justifications to support the reasonableness of the
NCAA's restrictions on payments to college athletes. The restrictions
are said to 1) preserve the "revered tradition" of amateurism in college
sports,20 4 2) permit the marketing of a "new product" that might not
otherwise be available, by maintaining the character and quality of col-
lege sports as distinct from professional sports,205 3) increase demand
for the college product by enhancing the image of collegiate sports,20 6 4)
foster the competitive balance deemed necessary to sustain public inter-
est in college athletics 20 7 and 5) to prevent the commercialization of col-
lege sports at the expense of educational values.20 8 None of these
justifications can withstand scrutiny, especially given the heavy burden of
proof that must be imposed on the NCAA. 20 9
a. Amateurism For Its Own Sake - The Olympic Ideal
Amateurism does appear to be a "revered tradition." The reaction
of students and colleagues to this Article's suggestion that college ath-
letes should be free to receive compensation confirms as much. The
public, with "stubborn innocence," adheres to the Olympic ideal of com-
petition for its own sake. 210 Nevertheless, amateurism for its own sake is
not a legitimate goal under the Sherman Act. Noneconomic values may
justify Rule of Reason analysis, but they cannot offset actual anticompeti-
203 Judicial scrutiny of the NCAA's regulations should also be at a heightened level because they
affect "student-athletes who neither participate directly in the group's rule-making nor have an op-
portunity to select representatives to act on their behalf." Weistart, supra note 177, at 169. Faculty or
administration representation is inadequate because the institutions' financial interests often conflict
with student needs.
InJanuary 1989, the NCAA, for the first time, created a student advisory committee. See 1989-90
NCAA MANUAL 306 (1989). The student committee, however, does not have voting rights, and, of
course, was formed subsequent to adoption of the NCAA's amateurism restrictions.
204 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
205 See id. at 101-02; McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Walters, 711 F. Supp. 1435, 1442 (N.D. Il. 1989).
206 See McKenzie & Sullivan, supra note 25, at 382-84.
207 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117; McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344
(5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Walters, 711 F. Supp. 1435, 1442 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Justice v. NCAA,
577 F. Supp. 356, 382 (D. Ariz. 1983).
208 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 123, 133 (White, J., dissenting); McCormack v.
NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Walters, 711 F. Supp. 1435, 1442 (N.D.
Ill. 1989); Weistart, supra note 177, at 175; Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach, supra note 103, at 722; Note,
supra note 132, at 676 n.106.
209 See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
210 See Walters v. Fullwood, 675 F. Supp. 155, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The depth of the public's
commitment to the Olympic ideal, however, may be questioned. Despite superiority in Olympic bas-
ketball, after the only noncontroverted defeat of a United States team, much of the public demanded
participation by professionals to ensure invincibility. Winning took priority over amateurism. See also
infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
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tive effects.2 1' Consideration of such values requires "some ultimate
reckoning of social and economic debits" that is best left to Congress. 21
2
Amateurism for its own sake is a noneconomic value that is particu-
larly unworthy of consideration under the Rule of Reason. Two belief
systems seem to underlie the pursuit of the Olympic ideal: 1) the college
game should be played for the fun of it, and 2) professional athletes are
already ridiculously overpaid - such absurdity should not be extended to
the college level.2 1 3 The Sherman Act, however, was not designed to
legislate motives or make judgments about the reasonableness of prices
or wages.
We do enjoy the exuberance of youth playing sports for the fun of
the game. Nevertheless, our economic system has always assumed that if
an individual provides a lawful service people value, there is nothing im-
moral about being paid for it. Our system does not attempt to legislate
motive. We prefer to view doctors as motivated by a desire to help peo-
ple, not by monetary interests. Yet, the Sherman Act would not permit
an agreement among hospitals to restrict the wages of staff physicians.
In short, the belief that college sports should be played merely for the
fun of it is inconsistent with our capitalist system. Furthermore, there
would be few limits to the breadth of such ajustification. It could support
restrictions not only on athletes, but on coaches, teachers and a variety of
other service workers or products.2 1 4 It cannot be a legitimate justifica-
tion under the Rule of Reason.
This Article is sympathetic to the position that professional athletes
are vastly overpaid and the concern that such nonsense would be ex-
tended to college sports. But that too is a danger inherent in our capital-
ist system. We, as a society, are afraid of our own priorities - we seem
to value sports too greatly. The Sherman Act, however, was not
designed to prioritize values beyond efficiency, and it certainly was not
intended to make judgments about the reasonableness of individuals'
wages.21 5 Why should athletes be treated differently than child stars,
news anchors, or even owners of sports franchises? In all of these cases
211 See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. Amateurism for its own sake may be redefined
to encompass efficiency values, e.g., amateurism to further educational goals or preserve public inter-
est and increase demand. These justifications are discussed infra at notes 234-45, 256-80 and accom-
panying text.
212 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963). This is especially true
when, as with the NCAA's restrictions on payments to college athletes, the defendants have a finan-
cial interest that is furthered by the asserted noneconomic value. Such defendants cannot unbiasedly
or objectively weigh competing values or protect the public's interest. See supra note 132.
213 The belief that compensation would interfere with educational values is treated as an in-
dependent argument below. See infra notes 256-80 and accompanying text.
214 For example, an agreement among networks and affiliates to limit payments for television
rights to college games might also be justified as preserving amateurism. A restriction on similar
payments to television series or movie producers might be justified by the analogous interest in
preserving artistic amateurism, that is, art for art's sake.
215 Even the labor laws do not make judgments about the reasonableness of wage offers. Rather,
the National Labor Relations Act seeks to promote collective bargaining in an atmosphere where
free market forces control the salary determination. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1935) ("Disputes about wages, hours of work, and other working conditions should be continued to
be resolved by the play of competitive forces .... This bill in no respect regulates or even provides
for [government] supervision of wages .... ); see also Roberts, supra note 110, at 81-86.
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the free market is allowed to set the appropriate compensation for the
individual's services. Concern that college athletes' wages cannot be
controlled, although understandable, is not a legitimate consideration
under the Sherman Act. In any event, it is ludicrous to have the schools,
which stand to gain by their salary limitations, make such judgments.
Even if the pursuit of amateurism were a recognized goal under the
Sherman Act, the NCAA's rules do not effectively further that goal. The
true amateur "tradition" has long been dead in major college sports.
Athletes are often motivated by a desire to reap the rewards of a profes-
sional career.2 16 They view college as a showcase for professional scouts,
not as an opportunity to play for the fun of the game. 2 17 Athletes receive
scholarships and other special treatment based on their athletic prowess,
not need. Although student-athletes may not receive their fair market
value, they nevertheless are paid. There are also frequent illegal pay-
ments by recruiters, coaches, alumni and agents. 218 In effect, the NCAA
defines an amateur as someone who does not receive more than the
NCAA members agree to pay them and argues that if student-athletes are
paid more, they are no longer amateur. This is tautological nonsense.
The "amateurism" regulations cannot be considered necessary to pre-
serve true amateurism. They are only essential to define and enforce the
NCAA's agreement.
It might be argued that some element of amateurism is better than
none. Bill Russell, the legendary Boston Celtic center, provides the ap-
propriate response:
The hypocrisy of amateur sports is offensive to anybody who cares. To
me, being an amateur is like being a virgin. It is an old idea that has
some innocence and charm, celebrated mostly by people to whom it
does not apply .... It is impossible to keep partially, though many try
to do so. It is associated with pretense and deception.2 19
Moreover, considering the direct and substantial effects on competi-
tion, 220 incremental benefits are not sufficient to justify the challenged
restraints.
Finally, it is disingenuous for the NCAA to rely on the Olympic ideal
to justify restrictions on payments to athletes. The NCAA and its mem-
ber institutions are largely responsible for the commercialization of
sports. They have long attempted to maximize television revenues,
sought sponsors for bowl games, and engaged in an elaborate marketing
operation. 221 These efforts belie a claim that the Olympic ideal is para-
mount. Rather, evidence suggests that the NCAA currently maintains re-
216 Despite the small number of college players who actually progress to professional careers, a
substantial number of student-athletes expect to become professional athletes. See REPORT No. 1,
supra note 8, at 14; REPORT No. 3, supra note 9, at 49-50.
217 Notre Dame, to enhance its athletes' professional value, has introduced classes on how to
handle the media. See NCAA News, May 31, 1989, at 23, col. 1.
218 See, e.g., D. EITZEN & G. SAGE, supra note 104, at 229;J. ROONEY, JR.,supra note 14, at 147-62;
J. TARKANIAN & T. PLUTO, supra note 14, at 210; M. TROPE, supra note 14, at 69-70, 76-77, 121-26;
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1989, at 27, col. I.
219 Quoted in D. EITZEN & G. SAGE, supra note 104, at 229.
220 See supra notes 49-59, 167-71 and accompanying text.
221 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 19, 1989, at 1; see also infra note 262.
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straints on payments to college athletes as cost cutting devices.222 This
inherent conflict of interest, particularly considering the absence of stu-
dent input,223 is yet another reason why Congress should be the body to
pursue amateurism for its own sake if society truly values that interest.
In sum, the Olympic ideal cannot justify the NCAA's amateurism
rules. Amateurism for its own sake is not a recognized goal under the
antitrust laws and, in any event, the restrictions on payments to college
athletes cannot be considered necessary to, and do not effectively fur-
ther, that goal.
b. The New Product Justification
The NCAA has argued, and the Supreme Court has accepted in
dicta, that the NCAA's restrictions on payments to college athletes are
necessary to produce a new product and are therefore procompetitive. 224
The "new product" justification originated in the Supreme Court's
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System opinion.225 In Broad-
cast Music, the Court confronted a challenge to a blanket license for copy-
righted music, issued by an organization of composers and publishing
houses. The Court noted that the blanket license involved ajoint setting
of price by competing composers, but concluded that the license could
not be equated with a simple horizontal arrangement among competi-
tors. 226 The Court reasoned that the blanket license was "quite different
from anything any individual owner could issue," and an agreement on
price was "necessary to market the product at all." 227 The NCAA ama-
teurism rules satisfy neither condition of the Broadcast Music "new prod-
uct" justification.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's unchallenged assumption, the
NCAA does not market a new product, i.e., college, as distinguished
from professional, athletics. 228 Collegiate sport existed before the
NCAA was formed and operated for many years without any central en-
forcement body.229 Member institutions independently produce college
athletics and could continue to do so if the NCAA were disbanded. In
effect, the NCAA operates as a classic trade association. 230 It facilitates
the independent business interests of its members. It does not produce
the new product attributed to it by the Supreme Court.
222 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
223 See supra note 203.
224 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984); Brief for Appellee at 23, McCor-
mack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2802).
225 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
226 Id. at 23.
227 Id.; see also NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 114. The Court, in Broadcast Music, also
found the continuing availability of individual licenses significant. 441 U.S. at 24. The opportunity to
individually negotiate license fees limited the market effect of the blanket license and provided some
objective indicia that the license resulted in net efficiencies.
228 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02.
229 Even after the NCAA was created, individual conferences operated under differing regula-
tions. SeeJ. FALLA, supra note 33, at 21-22, 126, 130. It was not until at least 1948 that the NCAA
attempted to enforce a uniform body of rules. Id. at 21-22, 126, 133.
230 See Roberts, supra note 143, at 240-46.
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Moreover, the restrictions on payments to college athletes are not
necessary to produce college sports. University sponsored athletics
would no less be "college sports" if players were paid. It is the associa-
tion with an educational institution, not the wages of the players, that
defines the product. Schoolyard games, although purely amateur, are
not "college sports." Schools that compensate athletes with financial
aid, on the other hand, are still considered to be producers of the college
product, even though the players no longer maintain purely amateur
status.23
1
Perhaps most fundamental, permitting amateurism restrictions to
define a "new product," distinct from the professional product, makes a
mockery of the antitrust laws. Too many price fixes could be justified on
that basis. For example, if all the comedy club owners in a geographic
area agreed not to pay standup comics, their agreement could bejustified
as necessary to produce amateur comedy or "amateur night" entertain-
ment. Similarly, a group of furriers may justify a high price fix as neces-
sary to produce a new product defined as "luxury" furs. Such results are
untenable.
Although the NCAA does not produce a new product defined as col-
lege athletics, it might be argued that it produces a new product defined
as national championship events. Nevertheless, the NCAA's restrictions
on payments to men's division I basketball and I-A football players are
not necessary to produce that product. Restrictions on payments to foot-
ball players are not even arguably necessary because the NCAA does not
at present sponsor any national championships for division I-A member
schools. For basketball, it might be suggested that the amateurism re-
strictions are necessary to produce a national championship because they
ensure fair competition. This, however, is just the competitive balance
argument that this Article analyzes and rejects below.23 2 Moreover, the
tournament selection process guarantees some semblance of competitive
balance. The NCAA invites only conference champions and other teams
thought to be highly competitive. If necessary, the NCAA could further
refine its selection process. In any event, differences in quality between
the top and last selections now exist and probably add to the excitement
of the tournament. 23
3
Thus, the NCAA's amateurism restrictions are not necessary to pro-
duce a product that would otherwise be unavailable to consumers and
therefore the restrictions on payments to college athletes are not
procompetitive under the Broadcast Music rationale.
231 The NCAA might protest that financial aid should not be deemed to remove amateur status.
In that case, however, restrictions on payments to college athletes may actually limit, rather than
expand, consumer choice. If payments were permitted, not all schools would choose to bid for col-
lege athletes. Consequently, some conferences could offer purely amateur contests while others of-
fered semi-professional competition. Two alternatives to the professional game, rather than one,
would be available.
232 See infra notes 246-55 and accompanying text.
233 See, e.g., Wolff, Great Escape, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 27, 1989, at 24-25 (describing
Princeton's one point loss to Georgetown).
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c. Amateurism to Enhance Image and Increase Demand
Rather than define its interest as the pursuit of the Olympic ideal,
the NCAA may reformulate its justification as seeking to preserve ama-
teurism to increase consumer demand. Enhancing public interest in col-
lege athletics can be viewed as procompetitive. 23 4 By stimulating
industry demand, the NCAA increases interbrand competition.235 Nev-
ertheless, this justification fails for both factual and legal reasons.
There is a major empirical question whether preservation of ama-
teurism increases consumer demand. Much evidence is to the contrary.
The public voices its approval of competition for its own sake as an ab-
stract proposition, but it does not seem to express this preference with its
dollars or viewership. U.C.L.A.-U.S.C. or Nebraska-Oklahoma games at-
tract far greater attendance and television ratings than Ivy league or divi-
sion III pairings. Following NCAA sanctions, the Universities of
Oklahoma and Florida, rather than encountering a reduction in demand,
experienced a "fund raising and recruiting bonanza. ' 236 The vehement
reaction of University of Kentucky basketball fans to publication by the
local paper of recruiting violations 237 similarly suggests that fan support
is not greatly influenced by a preference for amateurism. Quite the con-
trary, fund raising increased nearly three-fold during the NCAA's investi-
gation of Kentucky's athletic program. 238 An individual's association
with a school, either because it is a local school or the individual's alma
mater, and the quality of the competition, not the degree of amateurism,
appear to be the primary determinants of demand. If the public truly
prefers purely amateur athletics, there might not be a need for an agree-
ment to restrict payments to college athletes. Each team's individual
self-interest would militate against payments to players. 239 Finally, pay-
234 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
235 In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court suggested that the unavailability of substitutes for the
purpose of market definition foreclosed the possibility of interbrand competition and therefore
made collective action by the NCAA inappropriate. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 115
& n.55. That analysis, however, mistakenly assumes that market definition is an absolute, rather than
an effort to draw lines along a continuum. Merely because products are excluded from a market does
not mean they offer no competition at the margins. Cross-industry competition is one reason trade
associations are formed and are generally considered lawful under the antitrust laws. Thus, collec-
tive action, even if industry members control 100%6 of a well-defined market, may still be
procompetitive.
236 J. RoONEY, JR., supra note 14, at 158.
237 See N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1988, at D25, col. 1.
238 See NCAA News, June 14, 1989, at 4, col. 1.
239 It may be that the public prefers amateur to professional college athletics as long as the qual-
ity of competition remains constant. In that case, Professors McKenzie and Sullivan suggest that
agreement may be necessary to prevent a "free rider" problem. See McKenzie & Sullivan, supra note
25, at 382-83. Each individual school has an incentive to bid on athletes to improve its quality and
competitiveness. Yet, if each school acted on this motivation, quality would not noticeably improve,
but amateur status would be lost. Professors McKenzie and Sullivan conclude that this free rider
problem is analagous to the problems faced by sellers of brand names and franchises, such as
McDonalds, and therefore justifies the NCAA's rules and regulations restricting payments to college
athletes.
The free rider analogy provides an unsatisfactory basis for justifying the NCAA's restraints.
Franchisors such as McDonalds, or manufacturers, impose vertical restrictions. In that case, the
franchisor's or manufacturer's self-interest coincides with that of consumers. See Premier Elec. Con-
str. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 368-70 (7th Cir. 1987); see also H.
HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 249 (1985). The same protection does not
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ments may actually improve the image of college athletics and enhance
demand by reducing the hypocrisy that now stains its reputation. 240 Pay-
ments to players are not immoral per se. The capitalist system supports
such payments. Rather, moral turpitude exists when rules previously
agreed to, have been violated. The formal acknowledgement of the right
to participate in a free market, where compensation is not banned, ought
to stem the tide of flagrant rules violations that newspapers are only too
pleased to report. The NCAA's image and the respect for its member
institutions may be restored.
The fundamental problem with the "enhancing public image and de-
mand" argument is that it is not a legitimate justification when a direct
restraint on competition is imposed. The Supreme Court has recognized
that benefits in one market may not offset harm in another. 24' The Sher-
man Act was designed to protect all sectors of the economy.242 The
NCAA's restrictions on payments to college athletes are not mere regula-
tory rules with incidental effects, 243 but are direct restraints that cause
substantial anticompetitive effects in the market for college players.
244
Speculative increases in demand for the college product cannot justify
that harm. Moreover, the public image justification, as a reformulation
of the "amateurism for its own sake" argument, shares one of the same
infirmities. The justification offers no boundaries. Consumers prefer su-
permarkets with low beef prices, yet a price fix among supermarkets on
the price paid to cattle ranchers for beef should not be legal; the image of
schools is enhanced if teachers work for the love of teaching, yet agree-
ments limiting their salaries cannot be acceptable; high associate salaries
and, consequently, high legal fees have sullied the reputation of large law
firms, 2 4 5 but that does not justify inter-firm agreements restricting associ-
ate compensation. The justification that amateurism enhances the
exist when horizontal competitors agree on terms, Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Con-
tractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d at 369-70. In particular, the NCAA does not analogously protect the inter-
ests of college athletes in maximizing their compensation. Moreover, even in the vertical context,
agreements fixing price are per se illegal. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S.
373 (1911). The "free rider" argument in the horizontal context appears remarkably close to the
"ruinous competition" justification that has repeatedly been rejected by the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978); NCAA v. Board
of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984).
240 See, e.g., Kirshenbaum, supra note 18, at 16; N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1988, at D25; D. EITZEN & G.
SAGE, supra note 104, at 229.
241 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-11 (1972); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963).
242 Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 609-11. The Court has acknowledged its "inability to weigh, in any
meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the economy against promotion of
competition in another sector .... Id. at 609-10. The NCAA might argue that the restraints' net
effect is procompetitive because, by ensuring more viable schools, it increases output and hence
demand for players' services. Increased demand, however, is immaterial if free market forces are
restrained so that prices cannot respond to the increase in demand. Moreover, the identical argu-
ment could be made by every defendant in buyer price fixing cases. There is no question that buyer
price fixing is illegal under the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948); National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421
(7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Pook, No. 87-274 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 1988) (LExIs, Genfed library,
Dist file).
243 Cf Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 382 n.17 (D. Ariz. 1983).
244 See supra notes 49-59, 167-71 and accompanying text.
245 See Anderson, W1'age Spiral, A.B.A. J., June 1989, at 26.
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NCAA's public image, like the Olympic ideal argument from which it de-
rives, is inconsistent with our capitalist system and thus cannot be cogni-
zable under the Sherman Act, even if its dubious factual premise were
accepted.
d. Competitive Balance
The NCAA has supported many of its regulations as necessary to
preserve competitive balance among amateur athletic teams. 246 The
Supreme Court has found this interest legitimate.247 It has reasoned that
fostering competition among NCAA members is procomipetitive because
it enhances the public's interest in intercollegiate athletics.
248
There is empirical evidence to support the view that consumer ap-
peal is enhanced by the unpredictability of outcome among opposing
teams. Well balanced competition, particularly among better teams, at-
tracts larger audiences. 249 Nevertheless, this fact -cannot justify the
NCAA's restraints on payments to college athletes.
Although interest may be enhanced by maintaining competitive con-
tests, or competitive leagues, there is no basis for imposing national re-
strictions, particularly in division I-A football. Most schools do not play
each other, and in football, where there is no national championship
among division I-A teams, it is likely most schools never will play each
other. At best, there needs to be competitive balance within conferences.
In any event, "only by the most fanciful characterization" do the
NCAA regulations promote balanced competition.250 Member institu-
tions' budgets vary widely. 251 Schools engage in extensive nonprice
competition. As a result, there is a well-recognized existing "power
elite." 25 2 Restrictions on payments to athletes cannot be justified as sup-
porting an interest that does not now exist.253 The restrictions, to a large
extent, merely channel funds from students to coaches, stadium contrac-
tors and weight room equipment companies. They do not provide com-
petitive balance.
Most fundamentally, the competitive balance argument poses a di-
rect challenge to the basic policy of the Sherman Act. In essence, the
246 See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984).
247 Id.
248 Id.; accord McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Wai-
ters, 711 F. Supp. 1435, 1442 (N.D. IIl. 1989).
249 See, H. DEMMERT, THE EcoNoMicS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 11 (1973);J. Weistart & C.
Lowell, supra note 138, at 595.
250 SeeJ. Weistart, supra note 177, at 179.
251 For example, in 1985, the athletic budgets within division I ranged from $528,000 to
$15,403,000. See NCAA News, May 24, 1989, at 3, col. 2. The differences between divisions were
equally pronounced. Id
252 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1310 (W.D. Okla. 1982),-aft'd, 707
F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), af'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); J. ROONEY, JR., supra note 14, at 74-80.
253 The NCAA might argue that the restrictions provide relative balance. That is, without the
restrictions, competition would be even more one-sided. This argument must be rejected. There is
no evidence to support this assertion and no "neutral standard" by which to measure the success of
the NCAA restrictions. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 118. "Reasonable first step"
arguments may be sufficient to justify incidental effects, but not direct and substantial restraints on
competition.
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NCAA argues that if member institutions are allowed to compete for col-
lege athletes, the same teams will attract all the top athletes, rout the
opposition, alienate viewers and, as a result, destroy the market. This
"age-old cry" of ruinous competition has consistently been rejected by
the Supreme Court.254 Payments to athletes are the free market mecha-
nism by which schools can compete for athletes. Permitting such pay-
ments will reduce the relative advantage enjoyed by unscrupulous
schools that currently bid for athletes' services in violation of NCAA
rules. Moreover, if the NCAA is correct that one-sided games reduce
consumer interest, the free market should resolve any problem that de-
velops without NCAA restrictions. Attendance and viewership of "6verly
powerful" teams will fall and their self-interest will motivate them to limit
their dominance. 255 Alternatively, other schools will eliminate such' teams
from their schedule and form their own competitive league. The result
would be several leagues or conferences with varying levels of competi-
tion. Consumer and student choice would be enhanced.
e. Educational Values
Several courts have said NCAA regulations "represent[ ] a desirable
and legitimate attempt 'to keep university athletics from becoming
professionalized to the extent that profit making objectives would over-
shadow educational objectives. .' ",256 Mounting commercial pressures
create a "win at all costs" attitude that threatens schools' educational
standards and practices. These pressures may affect a school's admission
policies, distribution of financial aid and scholarships among students,
standards for promotion and athletic eligibility and allocation of re-
sources among educational and extra-curricular programs. 257 The pro-
hibition on payments to athletes arguably is designed to further
educational values by reducing those pressures. Limits on compensation
are also said to encourage student-athletes to choose their college, at
least in part, based on educational quality, not economic reward.258
Educational values are an important interest that should be recog-
nized under the Sherman Act. Although noneconomic interests gener-
ally have limited status under the Rule of Reason, 259 the furtherance of
educational values by the NCAA transcends the noneconomic interests.
The NCAA member schools' primary function is education. Regulations
furthering that goal therefore may be viewed as product improving or
enterprise enhancing, and hence procompetitive. Nevertheless, the ama-
254 Seesupra note 239; see also Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1310 (W.D. Okla.
1982), aft'd, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
255 See Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1310-11 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd, 707 F.2d
1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
256 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 123 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Kupec v. Atlantic
Coast Conference, 399 F. Supp. 1377, 1380 (M.D. N.C. 1975)); accord McCormack v. NCAA, 845
F.2d 1338, 1344-45 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Walters, 711 F. Supp. 1435, 1442 (N.D. Ill.
1989). See also Note, supra note 132, at 676 & n.106.
257 See Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach, supra note 103, at 722.
258 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 133 (White,J., dissenting); Note, supra note 132, at
676 n.106.
259 See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
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teurism rules are neither necessary nor narrowly tailored to further the
NCAA's asserted goal.
NCAA member schools have already commercialized college athlet-
ics 260 and created a "win at all costs" mentality that threatens educa-
tional standards. 261 Sports is big business and division I members are
willing participants. 262 With millions of dollars in tournament or bowl
revenues and alumni contributions at stake, schools often place intense
pressure on coaches to succeed. Job retention and salary bonuses are
increasingly tied to winning, not graduation rates. 263 As a result, coaches
may recruit athletes ill-equipped for college, demand extended practice
hours that compromise study time, retain academically troubled students
or even overlook, if not encourage, academic fraud.264 The rejection of
regulations prohibiting freshmen eligibility, lengthy basketball and foot-
ball seasons, exhorbitant salaries of coaches relative to professors, reten-
tion of winning coaches regardless of their athletes' academic per-
formance, and late night starts to increase television exposure all repre-
sent commercial concerns prevailing over educational interests. 265 The
very fact that the NCAA believes agreement on athlete compensation is
necessary to preserve educational values reveals the relative priorities of
its member institutions. If member schools value academics over athlet-
ics and believe payments to athletes undermine educational values,
schools could independently choose to reject such payments. 266
The commercialization of sport and its concommitant emphasis on
winning has unquestionably denigrated the educational component of
260 See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
261 See, e.g., Spander, Sports Pages Read Too Much Like a Police Blotter, Sporting News, Feb. 27, 1989,
at 7; N.Y. Times,June 22, 1989, at 43, col. 1; Kirshenbaum, supra note 18, at 16; Gup, supra note 10,
at 54-55; N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, § 5, at 1, col. 1; see also supra note 11.
262 See supra notes 1-5, 98-102 and accompanying text. Professors Eitzen and Sage categorize big-
time college athletics as "corporate sport." That is, "sport as spectacle; sport as big business; sport
as an extension of power politics." D. Err'EN & G. SAGE, supra note 104, at 19. The governing body
in "corporate sports" (the NCAA) devotes less energy to satisfying the needs for which they were
created and becomes more interested in perpetuating the organization through public relations and
making profits. Id.
263 SeeJ. ROONEY, JR., supra note 14, at 161; Notebook, Sporting News, May 22, 1989, at 42; New
Meaning For March Madness, Sporting News, Apr. 10, 1989, at 20; USA Today, Mar. 19, 1989, at 3C,
col. 1.
264 SeeJ. ROONEY, JR., supra note 14, at 160-62; G. WONG, supra note 5, at 13-24; NCAA News,
Nov. 20, 1989, at 5, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1989, at 32, col. 1; USA Today, Mar. 19, 1989, at
3C, col. 1; Kirshenbaum, supra note 18, at 17-18. This is not to suggest that all coaches are uninter-
ested in student-athletes' academic performance. Many responsible coaches view education as the
primary function of the university and are very supportive of student academics. See REPORT No. 3,
supra note 9, at 29.
265 See, e.g. N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1989, at 44, col. 1; Craig, Do Networks Really Dictate Starting Times?,
Sporting News, Feb. 13, 1989, at 6; Nightingale, Controversial Late Knight With Hoosiers, Sporting
News, Feb. 13, 1989, at 11. Another of the more noxious examples of the commercialization of
college athletics is the operation of big-time college basketball shoe contracts. Shoe companies pay
head coaches thousands of dollars to require student-athletes to wear the manufacturer's product.
See Brown, Rubber Sole: Should College Basketball Coaches Accept Sneaker Money? 7 Err. & SPORTS LAw 3
(Winter 1989). The athlete does not get to choose the brand that is most comfortable or effective to
play in, and of course, does not receive any cash payment himself. Id.' The university happily acqui-
esces in their coach's deal because the lucrative perquisite means the school can offer a lower base
salary and still maintain a competitive compensation package.
266 The NCAA must fear that schools would not choose to prohibit payments if the pursuit of
educational values meant sacrificing revenues to schools who chose to pay athletes.
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student-athletes' college experience. Athletes feel the pressure to per-
form to please, or at least satisfy their coaches, and to impress profes-
sional scouts. 267 Successful performance can mean millions of dollars for
themselves and their universities. As a result, they spend more hours at
their sport during the athletic season than studying and attending
classes. 268 Their attendance and classroom performance suffer.269 As
the late Bear Bryant said:
I used to go along with the idea that football players on scholarship
were 'student-athletes,' which is what the NCAA calls them. Meaning
a student first and an athlete second. We were kidding ourselves, try-
ing to make it more palatable to the academicians. We don't have to
say that and we shouldn't. At the level we play, the boy is really an
athlete first and a student second.
270
Thus, it is disingenuous to suggest that restraints on student-athletes are
necessary to prevent commercializing sports at the expense of educa-
tional values.271 Member schools have already sacrificed educational val-
ues to commercial interests and student-athletes largely have adopted
these priorities. There is no reason to believe that payments to student-
athletes will result in a significantly greater focus on their on-field per-
formance than exists today.
The elimination of the NCAA's amateurism rules and the acceptance
of payments to athletes may actually further educational objectives. For
example, given salaries for participating in sports, students would have
less incentive to terminate their education and seek "hardship" status for
the professional draft. High school students would have an increased
incentive to finish high school and maintain grade eligibility. College
students would similarly be encouraged to preserve their academic eligi-
bility. Payments could be used to fund schooling after expiration of the
four years of athletic eligibilty permitted by the NCAA. 272 Salaries could
be creatively structured to encourage academics. Contracts could con-
tain penalty clauses for noncompliance with educational requirements
273
or bonus clauses rewarding exceptional academic performance. Perhaps
the contract could withhold partial payment until the college athlete
267 Many student-athletes view college athletics as their showcase for a professional career. See
supra note 216.
268 See REPORT No. 1, supra note 8, at 26. Many athletes also are channeled into less academically
demanding courses. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1989, at 44, col. 1.
269 See id. REPORT No. 1, supra note 8, at 8E; REPORT No. 3, supra note 9, at 5E-6E.
270 Quoted in J. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA 254 (1976); accord D. EITZEN & G. SAGE, supra note
104, at 128.
271 See also J. WEISTART, THE LAW OF SPORTS 183 (Supp. 1985) ("the credibility of a purported
objective is substantially affected by the consistency with which it is pursued ... some proferred
educational defenses will similarly wilt in the face of close scrutiny of the extent to which they embue
the total regulatory scheme").
272 The average college student requires 5.5 years to graduate. See J. TARKANIAN & T. PLUTO,
supra note 14, at 338.
273 Cf Switzer Says He's Ripe for NFLJob, Sporting News, May 29, 1989, at 42 (former Coach Barry
Switzer suggests that salary penalties are an effective means of discipline that is currently unavailable
in college sports).
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graduates. 274 Alternatively, to the extent permitting payments to college
athletes reduces profits, some schools may cut back on or restructure
their athletic program, foregoing the revenues and commercialism that
are a bane to educational goals. 2 75
The primary objection to the "educational values" justification is not
that the restrictions on payments to athletes do not further that interest,
but that there are less restrictive means to accomplish the NCAA's goal.
Again, a national agreement to restrain payments is unnecessary. At a
minimum, individual conferences should be permitted to make their own
rules concerning payments to athletes. More fundamentally, there are
many direct methods of regulating academic goals and performance that
would more effectively serve educational values without directly re-
straining price competition.276
The fear that students would make unwise choices when selecting a
college also cannot justify the NCAA's restrictions on payments to ath-
letes. It is presumptuous and excessively paternalistic to assume stu-
dents, and their parents or other advisors, are incapable of determining
the mix of athletics and academics that best suits their needs. In any
event, students are currently forced to make identical choices. Nonprice
athletic concerns compete with academic interests. The "power elite"
offer better professional exposure, more renowned coaches, and more
extensive training facilities. Payments to athletes would not greatly
change the required choice. Indeed, to the extent competitive bidding
occurred, there would be little price difference among interested
schools. 277 If anything, permitting payments might have the beneficial
effect of reducing the incentive to attend the unscrupulous schools that
now offer illegal payments.
Finally, it may be argued that payments to athletes would undermine
their academic environment by isolating them from the "normal" college
student. Again, the commercialization of collegiate sports and emphasis
on winning has already had that effect. Many schools have special athlete
dorms and cafeterias, as well as special classes and tutorial programs to
facilitate the scheduling of games and practice sessions. Athletes are cul-
turally and physically distinct.278 The many hours of practice and weight
room work furthers the feelings of isolation. More than sixty-two per-
cent of students at competitively superior schools already say it is harder
or much harder as a college athlete to be regarded as a serious stu-
274 Currently, many college athletes leave school after their college athletic elegibility expires and
before they get their degree. See, e.g.,J. TARKANIAN & T. PLUTO, supra note 14, at 323; SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, Feb. 19, 1989, at 19.
275 Similarly, by reducing the marginal value of players, i.e., the difference between the cost of,
and benefits provided by the player to the university, a free market system reduces the incentive to
engage in academic fraud to maintain player eligibility.
276 See infra notes 352-58 and accompanying text.
277 Although not all schools may bid for a student-athlete's services, there should be a sufficiently
broad range of interested schools to satisfy most students' educational needs. The current "power
elite" contains many exceptionally fine educational institutions such as the University of Michigan,
the University of Notre Dame, Duke University, and the University of Virginia.
278 See Kirshenbaum, supra note 18, at 34.
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dent,279 and over seventy-three percent report that they frequently feel
different from other students.280 Thus, although athletes' academic envi-
ronment may be a valid interest, payments to athletes would at most have
a de minimis effect on their sense of isolation. Regulations aimed at elimi-
nating athlete dorms and training tables, limiting practice hours, and lim-
iting the length of seasons would more directly further the asserted
interest without imposing direct restraints on price competition.
In sum, educational concerns strike at the heart of NCAA members'
basic function and are a cognizable justification under the Sherman Act.
Nevertheless, upon close examination, restrictions on payments to stu-
dents, at most, are only marginally effective in furthering educational in-
terests. It is the "win at all costs" attitude created by member schools
and the prospect of a professional career that undermine educational val-
ues. More important, there are many less restrictive alternatives that do
a better job of furthering educational interests without directly re-
straining trade. Those alternatives may mean sacrificing member
schools' own revenues, rather than those of their students. Such cost
savings, however, cannot validate buyer restraints any more than en-
hanced revenues can justify seller price fixes.
At first blush, the NCAA's amateurism restrictions appear reason-
able. At one time they may have been motivated by altruistic concerns.
The restraints, however, cannot now survive antitrust scrutiny. The
NCAA's prohibition on payments to athletes has a direct and substantial
effect on competition for student-athletes. The asserted justifications for
the restraints are either not cognizable under the Sherman Act, are not
furthered by the restraint, or are achievable through less restrictive alter-
natives. Accordingly, no elaborate balancing is required - the restraints
must be unlawful under Section 1. Although the legal analysis seems
simple, the implications of a judicial finding of illegality may be complex.
The following section addresses several nonlegal objections to and
ramifications of a free market system for bidding for student-athletes'
services.
IV. Nonlegal Objections To A Free Market Approach
Although the legal justifications for limiting payments to college ath-
letes are insufficient to support the NCAA's restraints, there are several
"nonlegal" reasons why a decisionmaker may fear finding an antitrust
violation. Some of these reasons are serious; others are overstated. This
Article concludes that whatever practical difficulties exist, they are more
appropriately handled through legislative action than through either the
private decisionmaking of entities that benefit from the otherwise illegal
restraints or judicial decisions contorting the antitrust laws.
279 See REPORT No. 1, supra note 8, at 48.
280 Id. at 55.
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A. Effect on High Schools
A decisionmaker may fear that finding the NCAA restraints on pay-
ments to athletes illegal will similarly require payments to high school
students or at least create the same abuses in high schools that now exist
in colleges.
Finding the NCAA members to be in violation of the antitrust laws
would not require a similar finding for high schools. Although there is a
National Federation of State High School Associations, it is an informal
organization that lacks the powers and revenues of the NCAA.2 81 There
is no national agreement prohibiting payments to athletes that is policed
by an elaborate investigative and enforcement mechanism. Moreover, at
least for public schools, agreement is not necessary. Zoning laws allocate
student-athletes; there is no bidding for their services. High schools, as a
rule, neither award scholarships nor make "illegal payments." Public
high schools, of course, should also be immune from suit under the state
action doctrine.282
The fear that the professionalization of college sports will create
abuses in high schools analogous to those now plaguing colleges has
some basis in reality. There is already a trend toward the commercializa-
tion of high school athletics.283 Nevertheless, the problems for high
schools should not approach those of colleges. The revenue potential of
high school sports is much less than that of college sports and there is
almost no national, and significantly less local, "recruiting" of student-
athletes. Moreover, it is unclear why recruitment of college athletes
through price, rather than nonprice, competition should exacerbate the
trend toward commercialization in high schools. Professional baseball
has recruited athletes directly out of high school, and, despite substantial
signing bonuses to baseball stars, high school baseball appears no more
commercialized than prep football or basketball. In any event, what
problems do develop are properly handled by state legislators or school
boards, not the NCAA.
B. High School Students and Contract Negotiations
A free market system would require colleges and universities to ne-
gotiate contracts with students while they were still in high school. This
may prove disruptive to the student-athlete. Some also might argue that
the high school student is too immature to handle both the negotiations
and the money that would be involved.
It is hard to imagine that contract negotiations could be more dis-
ruptive to the high school student than the current recruitment ordeal
already is. For some, hundreds of schools attempt to maintain constant
contact.28 4 Often, the only way prep phenoms survive their senior year is
to have an advisor or coach screen recruiters. Such advisors could just as
easily help in contract negotiations.
281 See G. WONG, supra note 5, at 7-9.
282 See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
283 See N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1989, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1989, at 39, col. 1.
284 See supra notes 42-44.
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A free market system might increase year-to-year costs if student-
athletes sought to negotiate new contracts. A partial solution would be
to sign players to four-year contracts. 28 5 The prevalence of requests for
contract renegotiation, however, makes this a less than totally satisfactory
answer. A provision for mandatory arbitration before an impartial arbi-
trator might be permissible and prevent extended disruptions. Never-
theless, this Article acknowledges that a free market system will increase
net transaction costs. Such costs, however, cannot justify the NCAA's
restraints any more than the elimination of search costs justifies a price
fix.
The costs associated with a new contract would assume greater pro-
portions if the student-athlete was free to negotiate with all schools every
year. Constant transfer to the highest bidder could be very disruptive to
his or her education.2 6 The NCAA's current transfer policy, requiring
student-athletes to sit out one year if they change schools, should dis-
courage such "school-hopping." 28 7 A formal transfer rule might not
even be necessary. If eligibility rules required substantial progress to-
ward a degree and a transfer caused a student-athlete to lose credits, the
eligibility rules alone might be sufficient to discourage salary motivated
transfers and protect educational interests.
The concern that high school students could not handle the large
amount of money that the best athletes might receive is easily dismissed.
Such reasoning is excessively paternalistic and overbroad. Why pay high
school students for any service? Furthermore, graduation from school
does not ensure maturity. If necessary, the advisors helping student-ath-
letes in contract negotiations could also assist in money management.
Professional baseball teams pay very attractive salaries and signing bo-
nuses to young high school athletes without any apparent repercussions.
There is no reason to believe football or basketball players are less fis-
cally responsible than baseball stars. Moreover, the concern, even if
valid, would at most justify requiring athletes' salaries to be placed in a
trust fund, not the elimination of all compensation. In any event, the
NCAA, which stands to benefit from its decision not to pay athletes, is
not the entity that is best suited to make judgments about the ability of
students to handle large sums of money.
285 The NCAA would need to modify the one year limitation on financial aid awards contained in
Bylaw 15.3.3. See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 142 (1989).
286 The additional possibility of student-athletes forming labor unions and striking their "em-
ployers" is discussed infra notes 309-19 and accompanying text.
287 See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 119 (1989). The NCAA's transfer policy should survive challenge
under the antitrust laws. Cf Weiss v. Eastern College Athletic Conference, 563 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (boycott allegation); English v. NCAA, 439 So. 2d 1218, 1224 (La. App. 1983) (court finds
transfer rule reasonable), cert. denied, 441 So. 2d 747 (La. 1983). The transfer rule only indirectly
affects price. A player may still transfer and play after one year if that player's original school's wage
offer is unsatisfactory. Moreover, the original school would have the incentive to bargain in good
faith because it would not want to undermine future recruiting. The effect that does result from the
restraint could be justified by the desire to preserve educational values, the true purpose of higher
education. Although academic eligibility rules may accomplish the same function, rigorous less re-
strictive alternative analysis may not be required because the restraint has only a small, indirect effect
on competition. See also infra notes 320-23 and accompanying text.
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C. Inequitable Treatment of Academic Superstars
Several colleagues have objected that payments to student-athletes
cannot be justified if academic superstars are not similarly rewarded. Not
only is the treatment inequitable, but it makes a troubling statement
about our society's priorities.
There is no inequity in treatment between superstar athletes and ac-
ademicians. Each is rewarded according to their value in the free market
system. Superstar athletes attract huge revenues to the university. Ex-
ceptional students, as a rule, do not.
It is sad that society seems to value athletes more than academicians.
This author would certainly prefer BoJackson's salary to his own. Never-
theless, our capitalist system does not provide rankings of occupations'
intrinsic worth. Many might wish to reward special education teachers or
social workers more than Sylvester Stallone or Brian Bosworth. Those
judgments, however, are left to the operation of the free market. Stu-
dent-athletes should not be treated disparately.
D. Loss of Non-Revenue Sports
The athletic departments of many universities subsidize "minor"
sports such as skiing, volleyball, or golf with the revenues produced by
their basketball and football programs. It might be feared that payments
to basketball and football players will jeopardize the support for the non-
revenue producing sports.
Allowing the free market to determine college athletes' compensa-
tion may have only a limited effect on nonrevenue producing sports.
Under NCAA rules, a university must offer a designated minimum
number of varsity sports to be eligible for division I classification. 2 8
Such classification is necessary to participate in the NCAA division I bas-
ketball tournament and the major college bowl games. In short, it will be
necessary to maintain the minimum number of varsity sports if the uni-
versity wishes to continue receiving its substantial revenues from the
"major" sports. 28 9
In any event, this objection to operation of the free market merely
represents a revenue concern. There is no reason student-athletes
should be the ones to provide the subsidies necessary to operate the non-
revenue producing sports. Rather, the revenues should be raised by do-
nations from those who are interested in the sport, alumni contributions,
increases in tuition or taxpayer assessments. This does raise, however,
the more general objection that payments to athletes will increase costs
to the university and its constituency.
288 See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 283 (1989).
289 There may be some reduction in the number of nonrevenue producing sports sponsored by
NCAA members. The average division I school now sponsors 17.5 sports. See NCAA News, July 5,
1989, at 3, col. 4. NCAA division I-A membership requirements demand members maintain pro-
grams in only 14 sports. See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 285 (1989). Thus, at least three programs, on
average, could be eliminated without risking division I-A status. Of course, a greater effect on the
nonrevenue producing sports might result if NCAA members voted to repeal the minimum sponsor-
ship requirements.
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E. Increased Costs to the University
There is little question that universities' costs will be increased if the
antitrust laws are enforced. Nevertheless, the amount of increase may
not be as large as some would imagine and should not jeopardize the
schools' educational mission. 290
First, many schools, will, as the Ivy League has already done, choose
not to bid for student-athletes' services. They will reorder their priorities
or find it impossible to compete with the major university programs. Re-
member, the antitrust laws do not require payments to athletes. Section
1 only prohibits agreements among competitors affecting price.
Second, for those schools wishing to bid for student-athletes, pay-
ments will not approach the salary obligations of professional teams.
Revenues from collegiate sport are generally not as great as from profes-
sional competitions. Consequently, star players do not have the same
value to schools that they have to professional teams. Salaries of stu-
dent-athletes should also be significantly lower than that of professional
athletes because they do not have as much talent as professionals, their
salaries must incorporate the greater risk involved in the evaluation of
less well-developed abilities, and they have a "useful life" of a maximum
of four years. 29' For many student-athletes, their free market value will
not exceed the value of their scholarship.
Third, "bidding" schools may be able to fund their wage offers
through cost savings from a reduction in nonprice competition expenses.
If players are paid, it may not be necessary to incur the same recruitment
costs, exorbitant salaries for coaches, or stadium or workout room ex-
penditures that are now used to distinguish schools and attract top ath-
letes. In short, there will be no reason to "cheat" on the cartel
agreement through nonprice competition if no agreement restricting
price competition exists.
In any event, any resulting increase in costs should not harm the
schools' educational mission. At most major universities, "virtually all"
funds from the revenue producing sports go to athletic departments
rather than academic budgets. 292 Athletic departments should be ex-
pected to operate within their budgets in a free market just like every
other business.
F. Effect of Treble Damage Liability
Individual member schools, in addition to the NCAA, would be sub-
ject to suit.2 93 Although athletic departments may properly be expected
to budget for free market costs, many will not have the funds available to
290 Cost savings from the NCAA's restictions alone cannot be a legal justification. If it were,
schools could justify agreements limiting teachers' pay or raising tuition costs.
291 The NCAA limits student-athletes to four years of athletic competition. See 1989-90 NCAA
MANUAL 106 (1989).
292 See Gup, supra note 10, at 55; Jensen, supra note 5, at 43-44 & n.38.
293 But see supra note 116 and infra note 300. To have standing for treble damages, a plaintiff
must demonstrate injury to "business or property." Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1986). College
athletes could easily satisy this requirement. Cf Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (pay-
ment of a higher price for goods purchased for personal use is injury to "property").
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cover unexpected treble damage awards. These costs and their effect on
the academic budget are not so easily dismissed.
A judge finding the N CAA's restraints in violation of the Sherman
Act might seek to avoid the impact of treble damage liability by either
finding individual plaintiffs' damages excessively speculative, holding
that plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages through a professional career,
or denying treble damages on public policy grounds. Such reasoning,
however, would be disingenuous and possibly subject to reversal.
Although the precise damage any individual student-athlete suffered
would be difficult to prove, precision is not required once liability has
been established. To establish their damages, plaintiffs need only show
"a just and reasonable estimate .. . based on relevant data." 2 94 Pub-
lished accounts of the value of Patrick Ewing and Herschel Walker to
their respective universities suggest that expert testimony would be avail-
able.2 95 Comparisons between the attendance figures, enrollment, appli-
cations and alumni donations before and after the student matriculated
could provide a relevant basis for those estimates. Damages should not
be denied because plaintiffs did not sign a professional contract to miti-
gate their injury. A professional career is not a substitute for a college
career. The student should not be forced to sacrifice an education to
mitigate damages. In any event, such mitigation might not be feasible.
There are several restrictions on the ability of athletes to seek profes-
sional careers before college graduation. 296 Finally, a judge could not
deny treble damages on public policy grounds. The plain language of
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 29 7 by the use of the words "shall recover,"
makes the imposition of treble damages mandatory.
298
Despite the very real prospect of treble damage liability, the poten-
tial damage to schools' educational goals may not be as great as first ap-
pears. First, the athletic department budgets should be able to absorb
some of the damage award. 299 Second, public universities may be im-
mune from any damage award under the eleventh amendment.3 00 The
294 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 124 (1969); Bigelow v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946). Damages are denied only when estimates are based
on pure speculation and conjecture. See id. at 264; Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624
F.2d 575, 580 (5th Cir. 1980).
295 See, e.g. Jennings & Zioiko, Student Athletes, Athletes Agents and Five Year Eligibility: An Environment
of Contractual Interference, Trade Restraint and High Stakes Payments, 66 U. DET. L. REv. 179, 215 (1989);
Koch, supra note 54, at 10, 24.
296 See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
297 15 U.S.C. 15 (1988).
298 See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 65 n.2 (1982) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 440-41 & n.30
(1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting); 454 U.S. at 442-43 & n.2 (Blackmun, J. dissenting); Everts v. Board
of Trustees, 604 F. Supp. 40, 43-44 (D. Wyo. 1985); Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist.,
526 F. Supp. 276, 281-82 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
299 See supra note 292 and accompanying text. Given the high priority placed on a successful
athletic program, some major universities may choose to pay treble damage awards with academic,
rather than athletic, department funds. See, e.g., Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 373 (D. Ariz.
1983). It would be anomalous, however, to allow the distorted priorities of individual schools to
justify direct restraints on competition.
300 Under the eleventh amendment, states are immune from private damage actions in federal
court unless sovereign immunity has been unequivocably abrogated or waived. See Dellmuth v.
Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 & n.1 (1985);
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four year statute of limitations will also bar many claims against both
public and private universities. 30 Third, many potential plaintiffs will
choose not to sue their alma mater. The student-athletes with the largest
potential claims will generally have already signed lucrative professional
contracts and not need the additional damages and attendant bad public-
ity. Lesser athletes' claims should not be worth the litigation costs. 30 2
Finally, any damage claim may be offset by the benefits, e.g., scholarship
aid, athletic training and coaching, provided by the university. These
may have been substantial, particularly for those athletes who success-
fully went on to a professional career.
The prospect of treble damages may not cause any greater injury
than some of the sanctions imposed by the NCAA. Reports estimate that
the University of Kentucky will lose over $2 million dollars from recently
imposed NCAA sanctions. 303 The University has already tapped other
sources of income to offset its losses.30 4 Similarly, the Universities of
Oklahoma and Florida successfully responded to NCAA punishments. 30 5
Even the complete elimination of SMU's football program did not de-
stroy that school's academic program. Schools also successfully adjusted
to the loss of television revenues following the Supreme Court's Board of
Regents decision.30 6 Thus, NCAA members have shown a resiliency in the
past when they have faced unexpected revenue losses. There is no rea-
son to expect that schools will be unable to adapt to treble damage
awards. Finally, distributions from the NCAA's new billion dollar televi-
sion contract could be used to finance any unexpected liabilities.3 07 If a
real problem remains, legislative intervention would be possible. Con-
gress has demonstrated the ability to act quickly when the prospect of
treble damage liability threatens to interfere with public policy.
30 8
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974). Whether a particular public university is considered
an instrumentality of the state under the eleventh amendment depends on facts peculiar to each
case. See Long v. Richardson, 525 F.2d 74, 76-77 (6th Cir. 1975). Most cases have found state univer-
sities to be within the amendment's protection. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344 (9th
Cir. 1982); Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451 F.2d 1287, 1290 (10th Cir. 1971); Lachica v.Jaffe,
578 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. N.Y. 1983); Ewing v. Board of Regents of the University of Mich., 552 F. Supp.
881 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Byron v. University of Florida, 403 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Fla. 1975).
301 Clayton Act § 4B, 15 U.S.C. § 15B (1988).
302 Plaintiffs who were athletic superstars in college, but did not make the transition to the profes-
sional game, because of injury or otherwise, would pose the greatest risk to university budgets. How-
ever, this class of potential plaintiffs should be relatively small.
303 See NCAA News, June 14, 1989, at 4, col. 1.
304 Id.
305 See supra note 236.
306 Fred Jacoby, Commissioner of the Southwest Conference, estimated that the deregulation of
television rights "cut the rights fees about in half." NCAA News, June 14, 1989, at 5, col. 2; see also
Koch, supra note 54, at 22 (estimating that total revenues collected by universities declined $42
million following the Board of Regents decision).
307 See supra note 3.
308 See, e.g., Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, P.L. 98-544, 15 U.S.C. § 35 (1988) (ex-
empting municipalities from treble damage liability). Congress acted before any final treble damage
judgment was assessed against a local government. See H.R. No. 98-965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1984).
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G. Impact on Other Laws
For most purposes, student-athletes are not now considered "em-
ployees" of the university. If the free market system controlled compen-
sation, that could change. That might affect the application of a wide
range of laws, including labor, workers' compensation, minimum wage,
tax, employment discrimination and pension laws. Most changes would
only influence expenses or revenues. The application of the labor laws,
however, presents the ugly prospect of striking students demanding cur-
riculum changes. A full discussion of the effects a free market system
would have on other laws is beyond the scope of this Article. A few com-
ments about its effect on the labor laws, 30 9 however, illustrate that fears
of wholesale substantive law changes and interference with academic in-
terests may be overstated.
Payments to student-athletes would not necessarily require applica-
tion of the labor laws. The NLRA does not define the term employee.
Whether a particular individual or group should be classified as an em-
ployee depends on the facts and is left to the informed discretion of the
National Labor Relations Board. 310 For policy reasons, persons who are
literally "employees" nonetheless may be excluded from coverage under
the Act.31 1 Student-athletes are now paid scholarships and provided
meals and athletic training. They also receive indirect benefits from col-
lege exposure. Despite these forms of compensation, they have n6t been
subject to coverage by the labor laws. Two policy justifications support
this result: the fiction that student-athletes are students first and the be-
lief that college sport is itself educational. Making compensation more
explicit may not undermine either policy justification for excluding stu-
dent-athletes from the Act's coverage, particularly if educational restric-
tions are maintained or enhanced. 3 12 In an analogous context, the
National Labor Relations Board has excluded interns, residents and
clinical fellows from coverage under the Act, even though their salaries
may exceed $20,000 per year.3 13
Even if the labor laws are applied to college athletes, educational
interests would not have to be affected.314 Eligibility rules requiring stu-
dents to progress toward a degree should discourage students from strik-
309 These comments primarily address federal labor law. The National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") exempts public employers from its coverage. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982). Public universi-
ties may be subject to generally analogous public sector labor laws.
310 See Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Fanning, 642 F.2d 492,496 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981).
311 Id. at 497.
312 In some areas of the law, however, student scholarships are deemed to create "employee
status" when such payments are for services rendered. See, e.g., Van Horn v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 457, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963) (workers' compensation); University of
Denver v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953) (same); Parr v. United States, 469 F.2d 1156
(5th Cir. 1972) (taxation of medical residents' income). Explicit payment contracts would obviously
satisfy that prerequisite for statutory coverage. It would also be easier to semantically categorize
student-athletes as professionals and view them as athletes, not students, if they were paid in cash,
rather than in scholarships and other services.
313 See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 253 (1976).
314 Collective bargaining over noneducational interests, e.g., pressures to play with injuries or the
maintenance of athletic facilities, on the other hand, seems entirely appropriate.
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ing classes, as opposed to games. Additionally, athletic departments
could be maintained separately from academic departments to ensure in-
stitutional educational policies did not become a "term or condition of
employment" for which bargaining was required. 31 5 The NLRB or state
labor board could even exempt such items from bargaining. They might
view curriculum requirements as defining the school's product and con-
sider it a management perogative 316 or exempt academic issues from bar-
gaining on public policy grounds. 317 Moreover, the NLRA only requires
bargaining, not agreement.3 18 A school could always stand firm against
changes in curriculum or educational requirements. Experience at the
professional level suggests that hard bargaining may result in some
missed games and disrupted schedules. These costs, however, are no
different from those that exist for all businesses.
In any event, the appropriate recourse for those concerned with the
potential impact of payments to college athletes on labor and all other
laws is the legislature. Student-athletes could easily be excluded from
the definition of "employee" in any statute.319 Thus, the impact of sub-
stantive law changes on university interests, even if serious, could not
justify the NCAA's direct restraints on competition.
H. Impact on Other NCAA Rules
Decisionmakers may fear that application of the antitrust laws to the
NCAA's amateurism restriction will encourage litigation against the
NCAA and jeopardize other NCAA rules. In particular, they may fear
NCAA educational regulations, such as its satisfactory progress require-
ments, will come under attack. There is, of course, no guarantee against
litigation. Some of the NCAA's eligibility rules have already been chal-
315 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 158(a)(5) (1982). The power of the athletic department over "la-
bor" negotiations could be defined in part 6 of the NCAA's rules. See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 39-41
(1989). The athletic departments at several universities already are separately incorporated and con-
duct their own labor negotiations. See N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, § 5, at 1, col. 1. Athletic eligibility
rules, as opposed to curriculum policies, might be considered a term or condition of employment for
which bargaining would be required. The NCAA's minimum eligibility requirements, however,
should be maintained without disruption. Separate bargaining units for each university would proba-
bly be required. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING 66-92 (1976). A nationwide unit would likely be too fragmented to have much power or effect.
Thus, bargaining at the national level would not force changes in the eligibility rules. At the univer-
sity level, student-athletes would agree to follow the NCAA rules because noncompliance would
mean NCAA sanctions that would injure both parties to the negotiation.
316 Cf First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (no duty to bargain over
partial closing because "[m]anagement must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process
to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business").
317 Cf University of Mich. v. Employment Relations Comm'n, 389 Mich. 96, 204 N.W.2d 218
(1973) (court exempted academic issues from bargaining to harmonize the requirements of the labor
act with a constitutional provision mandating Board of Regents autonomy).
318 See NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937); NLRB v. American Ins. Co.,
343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
319 See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 3352 (West Supp. 1989) (excluding amateur athletes from the work-
ers compensation statute).
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lenged.3 20 The NCAA's educational restrictions, however, should with-
stand antitrust scrutiny.
321
Educational rules are easily distinguished from the NCAA's amateur-
ism restrictions and should quickly be upheld under the Rule of Reason.
Such rules, unlike the NCAA amateurism restrictions, do not directly af-
fect price and therefore are not presumptively unlawful. They do not
require the same rigorous examination of less restrictive alternatives that
the NCAA's amateurism restrictions demand.3 22 The rules more directly
further the true purpose of the university members - preserving or en-
hancing educational values, than do the amateurism restraints. Further-
more, the primary antitrust injury asserted from educational eligibility
rules would be a reduction in competition among the smaller pool of
eligible student-athletes. To the extent competition was affected, higher
wages would be required. That would injure, not benefit, NCAA mem-
bers. Thus, there would be more reason to believe the NCAA was unbi-
ased in weighing the harms and benefits from its educational rules.
Hence, less reason for judicial or governmental intervention than exists
for the NCAA amateurism restraints.
The NCAA might argue that even if it prevailed under the Rule of
Reason, the prospect of multiple litigation would have a chilling effect on
enactment or enforcement of educational restrictions. This argument
has some force. Nevertheless, precedent could be quickly established to
support summary judgment or 12(b)(6) motions in later cases. No mat-
ter what the governing law, there is always the possibility of frivolous
suits. The NCAA's argument would logically require the NCAA to have




The transition from a loosely run cartel with restrictions on pay-
ments to a free market system of college athlete compensation may not
be smooth. Some teams will choose to bid for the services of student-
athletes; others, e.g., Ivy League schools, will not. Ideally, bidding
schools would compete against each other and nonbidding schools
would form their own leagues or conferences. Schools, however, arrange
schedules years in advance. Thus, at least initially, there may be some
noncompetitive contests. Subsequently, there may be a constant shifting
in the composition of conferences as teams change their decision about
whether to pay college athletes.
This problem also may not be as serious as first appears. In effect,
this is just the competitive balance argument previously rejected.3 24
Even without price competition for student-athletes, there are profound
320 See, e.g.,Jones v. Wichita State Univ., 698 F.2d 1082 (10th Cir. 1983); Associated Students,
Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974).
321 A complete analysis of the antitrust implications of all NCAA rules is beyond the scope of this
Article.
322 See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
323 See supra notes 84-109 and accompanying text.
324 See supra notes 246-55 and accompanying text.
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imbalances among and within conferences. Northwestern does not fare
well against the University of Michigan; North Carolina regularly beats
Wake Forest. Athletic budgets vary widely.3 25 A free market may just
convert the unequal nonprice competition to unequal price competition.
Moreover, if the professional experience is any example, a free market
will not result in one team buying all the best talent.
3 26
Eventually, conferences could sort themselves out to form "bid-
ding" and "nonbidding" conferences. It might even be permissible to
have conference rules against payments. 327 Individual conferences, un-
like the NCAA, would probably not have market power. Moreover, there
would. be too many conferences to have mutual interdependence result
in all conferences choosing not to pay. 328 Thus, student-athletes would
have at least some choice among education/money options.
If "nonpaying" conferences were formed, there might be a possibil-
ity of in-conference cheating. A team could improve its in-conference
standing and earn increased revenues by making "illegal" payments to
student-athletes. That incentive, however, would not be as great as pres-
ently exists. The potential revenues from cheating in nonbidding confer-
ences would not match those now received by the top major colleges.
The incentive to cheat would be further reduced if conference schools
shared revenues. Moreover, the superstar athlete would likely not
choose a "nonbidding" school. The exposure would not be as great and
the compensation offer, because it would have to be secret, would proba-
bly be less than at openly bidding schools. The value of more marginal
players, on the other hand, may not exceed the cost of a scholarship and
hence may not warrant any "illegal" bidding. The experience in the Ivy
League and division III provides some reassurance. Despite limiting
scholarships to need, cheating has not appeared to be epidemic. Thus,
there should not be significant shifts in the composition of conferences
caused by some members cheating on the conference agreement.
J. New Abuses
If a free market system for paying college athletes were to be
adopted, new abuses may take the place of existing problems. For exam-
ple, schools might seek to flunk high-paid, but disappointing student-
athletes. Agents or advisors might encourage choices that maximize
their revenues rather than their clients' interests.
Both possibilities, although real, are not different in kind than
problems that currently exist. Moreover, there are more narrowly tai-
325 See supra note 251.
326 Teams have the self-interest in avoiding such dominance because fan appeal diminishes. Ad-
ditionally, marginal revenues generated by signing a star player decrease with each additional sign-
ing. See Noll, Attendance and Price Setting, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS, 115, 123-24,
135-36 (R. Noll. ed. 1974). Therefore, a team without any stars should outbid a team that already has
several top players.
327 See supra note 133.
328 A conference that chose to pay student-athletes would have a huge recruiting advantage and
could garner enhanced attendance and television revenues. Unlike the current system, teams would
not have to fear NCAA sanctions or loss of NCAA membership benefits to reap those immediate
rewards.
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lored methods to deal with those abuses than eliminating all payments to
college athletes.
The fear that schools would deliberately fail disappointing student-
athletes gives too little credit to teachers and administrators. Most act
scrupulously. Moreover, the normal litigation possibilities exist to pro-
tect against this abuse. 329 In any event, schools now have an incentive to
flunk nonproductive players. Athletic scholarships are limited and a stu-
dent-athlete's scholarship cannot be revoked for poor performance or
injury.330 Thus, flunking the nonproductive student-athlete, or encour-
aging the student to drop athletics voluntarily, can open a scholarship
opportunity for a -more promising prospect.33 1 Payments to athletes
should not significantly increase the prevalence of this type of abuse. Ad-
ditionally, it would be absurd to allow schools tojustify their restraints by
claiming that without them they would act unscrupulously.
The apprehension that agents or advisors will compromise their cli-
ents' interests also does not justify the NCAA's restraints. Advisors now
have some incentives that may conflict with those of their advisees. They
may seek jobs or benefits for themselves in exchange for encouraging
their advisees to attend a particular university. Payments to athletes
should not significantly increase the incidence of unsavory advisors. In
any event, agents can be directly regulated through ihe common law fi-
duciary duty of loyalty. There is also the prospect of legislative action if
abuses seem widespread.33 2
V. Benefits of a Free Market System
If there were no other benefits, application of the antitrust laws to
college athletes could be justified as preserving the rule of law. Thejudi-
cial system requires consistent interpretation of governing legal princi-
ples. Disingenuous analysis and exceptions to suit expediency
undermine respect for the law. A thorough antitrust analysis establishes
that the NCAA's amateurism restrictions violate Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. The NCAA rules impose direct restraints on the student-ath-
lete labor market. Those restraints depress wages, misallocate resources
and result in market inefficiencies. Stubborn adherence to naive views
about major college athletics or speculative and overstated fears about
changing the status quo should not be allowed to overrule reasoned
analysis.
Operation of the free market would correct many of the market inef-
ficiencies that result from the artificial suppression of athletes' wages. If
329 There would not seem to be excessive proof problems. Academic work can be reviewed and
the people pressured might be encouraged to come forward. See e.g., Monaghan, Fired Teacher Wins
Suit Against Officials at University of Georgia, Is Awarded $2.5 Alillion, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 19,
1986, at 29 (jury agreed thatJan Kemp was dismissed because she refused to grant preferred treat-
ment to student-athletes).
330 See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 143 (1989).
331 See, e.g., D. ErrZEN & G. SAGE, supra note 104, at 129.
332 Fifteen states already have rules governing the conduct of professional sports agents. See Rod-
gers, States Revamp Defense Against Agents, 6 SPORTS LAW. I n.1 (Winter 1988-89); see also Sobel, The
Regulation of Sports Agents: An Analytical Puimer, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 701 (1987).
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the gap between the marginal value and cost of athletes is reduced,
schools will no longer have the incentive to compete for student-athletes'
services through inefficient forms of nonprice warfare. Excessive recruit-
ment costs, coaches salaries and capital expenditures may be eliminated.
Additionally, the high school student whose greatest value is as a stu-
dent-athlete will be encouraged to attend college rather than employ his
talents where they are less valuable. Society, as well as the student-ath-
lete, benefits.
Application of the antitrust laws to the NCAA's amateurism restric-
tions is-justified by much more than jurisprudential and economic poli-
cies. Compensating student-athletes introduces some measure of
fairness to an otherwise inequitable system. Student-athletes generate
millions of dollars for their universities. Football and basketball players
risk their health playing what are often brutal sports. Yet, college ath-
letes are denied compensation by the NCAA and "forced to live with the
fiction that they, like flowers, exist on air, sunshine and water. '3 33 NCAA
rules make it almost impossible for the student-athlete to earn spending
money or accept payments for incidental expenses. 334 The NCAA rules
even deny student-athletes full use of government grants. 335 The major-
ity have less than twenty-five dollars per month to satisfy personal
needs.33 6 College athletes do receive an education, but many schools
devalue that education by channeling academically unprepared athletes
333 See Neff, Scorecard, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 18, 1988, at 21.
334 Id.
335 A student athlete can receive only $1400 in Pell Grant money above a full scholarship. See
1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 139 (1989). The remaining $900 goes to the university. As of Aug. 1, 1990,
student-athletes will be able to receive up to $1700 in Pell Grant money. See NCAA News, Jan. 22,
1990, at 26, col. 1.
336 See supra note 9. Several writers in the popular press, as well as a few coaches, have recom-
mended stipends for college athletes above their scholarship to remedy this perceived inequity. See,
e.g. N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1988, at D25, col. 1; Dallas Morning News, July 1, 1985, at 4A, col. 1. This
Article agrees that stipends represent an improvement over the existing system of compensation in
college athletics. It is doubtful, however, that NCAA members will choose to share their wealth, see
supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text, and in any event, a stipend is only a partial solution.
Some inequity would remain because better athletes would not receive their fair market value. Con-
sequently, cheating to attract the star players would continue, albeit at a reduced rate. Additionally,
the NCAA still would need to supervise recruiting and campus activity to ensure that payment limits
were not exceeded. This would use resources that otherwise might be available to enforce educa-
tional restrictions. Moreover, the combined impact of technical and flagrant rules violations still
would breed cynicism and disrespect for the law. The stipend proposal does not go far enough. The
stipend proposal also remains an antitrust violation. NCAA members would have to agree on the
price to pay athletes. The only change from the current system would be the amount of the agreed
upon compensation. The antitrust analysis, therefore, would be virtually identical to the analysis
presented earlier. See supra notes 81-280 and accompanying text.
A government-established stipend would avoid the antitrust dilemma. The legislature would be
an impartial decisionmaker uninfluenced by the cost savings a low stipend would provide. Neverthe-
less, it is not generally the function of the government to makejudgments about the worth of partic-
ular occupations and government regulation has generally proven to be inefficient. See, e.g., L.
SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN, & H. FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: ANTITRUST 444
(6th ed. 1983); Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1207, 1231-35 (1969); Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 619, 643
(1969). Unless the stipend proposal contained a creative indexing feature, it either would require
constant government supervision or would become quickly outdated. Accordingly, this article also
rejects government regulation, at least until either courts refuse to apply the antitrust laws or experi-
ence demonstrates that a free market approach is unworkable.
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into "gut" courses and demanding so many practice hours that success-
ful completion of classes becomes all but impossible.33 7 In any event,
what athletes really receive in exchange for their efforts is merely the cost
of tuition, not the value of an education.338 That compensation is plainly
inequitable. For example, in 1987, the University of Nebraska football
program reportedly generated nearly $11 million in revenues, but dis-
tributed only $150,000 in scholarships to football players.3 39 Such statis-
tics have prompted some to call football players "slave labor. ' '340
Although this description is a bit melodramatic, it is shameful that col-
lege athletics has reached a state that could foster such opinions.
Paying student-athletes their free market value also would reduce
the hypocrisy that now plagues major college athletics. Major college
programs have themselves commercialized amateur athletics, usually at
the expense of educational values. No longer is the sports program's
constituency the athlete or the student body. Television networks,
boosters and fans take priority.34 1 Some NCAA regulations are brazenly
hypocritical. For example, student-athletes cannot market their name or
likeness or use their athletic ability to raise funds for themselves. The
same activities are permitted, however, if the money collected is contrib-
uted directly to the university.3 42 The money generated from college
athletics has reached such levels that it is almost inevitable that all per-
sons involved in big-time college athletics develop a "win-at-all costs"
mentality that compromises educational interests. 343 Yet, the major col-
leges continue to pursue the fiction that they are engaged in amateur
athletics. As one critic has said, "if it's really amateur athletics, let every-
one in the gate free." 344 Application of the antitrust laws to the NCAA's
amateurism restrictions would end this hypocrisy.
Most importantly, compensating student-athletes may go far to re-
storing societal norms and values. 345 A system that prevents student-
athletes from receiving a minimum income for personal expenses en-
courages the athlete to receive "under-the-table" payments from alumni
337 See N. Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1989, at 1, col. 2 (more than one third of American colleges with
major men's basketball programs have player graduation rates below 20%. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19,
1984, at A27, col. 1; see also supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text; infra note 353.
338 The student-athlete always could choose to obtain an education with their own funds (or a
loan).
339 See Omaha World-Herald, Apr. 1, 1988, at 13, col. 1.
340 See, e.g., Lieber, Pro Football; Extra Points, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 9, 1985, at 74; Neff, supra
note 333, at 21.
341 See'supra notes 98-102, 260-66 and accompanying text.
342 See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 59, 63-64 (1989).
343 See supra notes 260-66 and accompanying text.
344 Lieber, supra note 340, at 74.
345 The NCAA apparently believes increased enforcement can restore respect for universities'
athletic programs. See, e.g., NCAA News, May 24, 1989, at 7. col.' 1. Increased enforcement is not a
satisfactory solution to the problems besetting college athletics. Enforcement efforts do little, if any-
thing, to remedy resource misallocation or the inequity and hypocrisy that plague the system. In the
short run, such efforts only highlight the abuses that besmirch schools' reputations. In the long run,
increased enforcement may deter some cheating, but it cannot eliminate it. The incentives to cheat
are too great and the avenues and "points of initiative" too numerous. Reliance on increased en-
forcement to correct the problems facing college sports is reminiscent of promises to collect delin-
quent payments from tax cheaters to avoid raising taxes. Both are naive, may incur greater expense
than they save, and are generally suggested to avoid greater political accoutability.
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or agents. It is no coincidence that most of the clients Norby Walters
fraudulently signed to representation contracts prior to their graduation
were poor.346 Aware that schools, athletic directors and coaches are
reaping the rewards of successful programs, athletes find it easy to justify
accepting such "illegal" payments. 347 The gap between the student-ath-
lete's value and cost to the university, on the other hand, ensures that
such "illegal" offers of payment will be made.34s The "win-at-all costs"
mentality that the commercialization of sports has produced makes
coaches and other administrators willing to overlook, if not contribute to,
these delinquencies. 349 Academic standards may similarly be relaxed to
prevent losing the services of contributing athletes. The wrong message
is being conveyed and its effects are beginning to appear on the police
blotter.350 As Dr. Harry Edwards has observed:
[Y]oung people who have been systematically instructed by word and
example in the fine art of lying, cheating, and self-delusion, manipula-
tion and ripping off have in extraordinary numbers become precisely
what we have programmed them to be: self deluded, lying, cheating,
manipulative rip-off artists.35'
Besides furthering economic policies and respect for the law, and
promoting fairness and ethical values, prohibiting the NCAA's amateur-
ism restrictions may improve educational interests. As suggested earlier,
payments can fund continuing education, create additional incentives to
maintain academic eligibility, and be structured to encourage graduation
or other desirable academic achievements.
352
In any event, a free market system could and should be supple-
mented with increased educational regulation and enforcement that di-
rectly promotes academics. 353 The NCAA could more rigidly restrict
hours of practice and the length of season and limit games to week-
346 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1989, at 27, col. 1.
347 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
348 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
349 The detailed and inflexible regulatory scheme also creates unknowing or good faith rules
violations. For example, it is a violation for an assistant coach to drive a student to his parent's
funeral even if the student reimburses the coach for the appropriate gas expense. See 1989-90 NCAA
MANUAL 164 (1989).
350 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
351 N.Y. Times, May 19, 1985, at D22, col. 1; see also supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
352 See supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
353 Some commentators suggest that a super-league be established in which there would be no
academic requirements. See, e.g. ,J. MICHENER, supra note 270, at 249-50. Underlying this proposal is
the belief that a large number of students are ill-equipped for and uninterested in pursuing an edu-
cation. Such high school students should not be forced to choose between foregoing what is the
primary feeder system to professional sports or pursuing a sham academic career. This Article re-
jects such proposals.
The extent of academic fraud resulting from the admission of unmotivated and unprepared
students may not be as great as commentators and anecdotal evidence suggest. Over 95% of incom-
ing student-athletes surveyed said getting a degree was important to them. See REPORT No. 1, supra
note 8, at 6-7. The greatest obstacle to academic success may not be motivation or preparation for
college, but the time demands of major-college athletics. Athletes spend more time in practice dur-
ing season than preparing and attending classes. Id. at 25-26. They say their status as athletes
makes it harder to keep up and that if they had an extra 60 minutes each week, they would spend the
largest part of that time on academics. Id. at 44-48; REPORT No. 3, supra note 9, at 37, 42. Thus, the
[Vol. 65:206
SPORTS AND ANTITRUST: PAY TO PLAY?
ends.35 4 It could tighten and better enforce educational eligibility re-
quirements. Satisfactory progress toward a degree could be defined,
rather than left to the discretion of individual schools. Passage of core
courses could be required.3 55 A reporting requirement detailing courses
taken and grades received could be imposed.3 56 Academic support pro-
academic abuses that exist can be reduced by limiting practice sessions or requiring a proportional
amount of time spent in study periods.
Even if the "super league" proponents do not overstate the prevalence of academic abuses,
their solution is not narrowly tailored to remedy the perceived problem. Rather than eliminate all
educational requirements, more direct alternatives can be adopted to prevent or reduce academic
fraud. Professors might be required to sign certification forms that student-athletes attended classes
and received no special treatment. Violators could be penalized with loss of tenure or salary. Stu-
dents could be required to sign similar acknowledgements, with penalties deducted from their sala-
ries or enforced through suits for fraud. See D. HOFFMAN & M. GREENBERG, supra note 20, at 82. If
the number of ill-equipped students admitted is believed to create the perceived problem, affirma-
tive action admissions through the athletic department might be limited, see infra note 357 and ac-
companying text, and noncredit remedial tutorials could be required. The primary objection to the
super league proposal, however, is that it undervalues the importance and beneficial effects of the
NCAA's educational requirements. The vast majority of student-athletes do not make it to the pros,
see D. ErrZEN & G. SAGE, supra note 104, at 287, yet an unrealistic number of students believe that
they will be the exception. See REPORT No. 1, supra note 8, at 7; REPORT No. 3, supra note 9, at 50. If
left to their own devices many would not attend classes. By imposing educational restrictions, the
students that do not go on to professional sports can be better equipped to enter alternative careers.
Even students who do not receive a degree benefit from their presence on campus. Not only are the
classes they do attend potentially beneficial, but exposure to a different environment and a world of
ideas can be socially and intellectually expanding. Moreover, if education were only optional, some
athletes who wanted an education might be forced to choose the noneducation alternative. The
pressure to succeed in college athletics, the showcase for the pros, might be too intense to risk the
competitive disadvantage that hours spent in and preparing for classes would impose. Educational
requirements may be paternalistic, but the evidence suggests that this is an area where paternalism
may be required. Until critics present more convincing proof of rampant and unsolvable academic
abuses, this Article prefers to strengthen, not eliminate, academic regulations.
354 The NCAA has some limits on practice hours and season length. See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL
174-256 (1989). These restrictions could be strengthened. Recent studies confirm that the heavy
time demands on college athletes result in missed classes and detract from academic performance,
particularly during the athletic season. See supra note 353; see also REPORT No. 1, supra note 8, at 8E;
REPORT No. 3, supra note 9, at 5E-6E.
The 1990 NCAA convention voted to reduce the length of the men's basketball season after a
record 24 ballots and more than four hours of debate. See NCAA News, Jan. 17, 1990, at 18, col. 33.
The games eliminated will probably be the games previously played during the Thanksgiving break.
Consequently, the "landmark" legislation should not substantially reduce the time pressures on col-
lege athletes. Moreover, the new legislation does not take effect until the 1992-93 school year and
there has already been talk that athletic directors, stung by lost revenues, may seek to modify the
new legislation. See, e.g., Sporting News, Jan. 22, 1990, at 34, col. 1; Detroit Free Press, Jan. 10,
1990, at IC, col. 5.
355 See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 116 (1989). It is a travesty that a reputable school such as the
University of Iowa can consider a student to be progressing toward a degree when the student take
courses such as billiards, bowling, watercolor painting and jogging, and fail many of them. See N.Y.
Times, Apr. 15, 1989, at 30, col. 1; Notebook, Sporting News, Apr. 3, 1989, at 42. The NCAA has
established a set of core courses for high schools students. See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 110-11
(1989). Similar post-entry requirements could be developed for college athletes. The NCAA's pow-
ers may be limited by the diversity of interests of its member institutions and its desire to maintain
institutional autonomy. See NCAA News, May 24, 1989, at 3, col. 2. Nevertheless, it should be possi-
ble to develop at least some minimum level requirements. Moreover, whatever requirements are
adopted can be limited to defining athletes' eligibility; they do not have to apply to general academic
standing. That is, if a school does not want to require its students to take, for example, a specified
number of math courses, it does not have to enact such a requirement. Student-athletes failing to
take the designated number of courses would be able to graduate just as any other student, but
would not be eligible to participate in athletics.
356 NCAA rules now require schools to certify that student athletes representing the university
are in good academic standing. See 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 318 (1989). A requirement that specific
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grams could be centrally mandated, not just left to the discretion of the
member schools. The number of student-athlete affirmative action ad-
mittees could be limited to the same percentage of nonathlete students
admitted under such programs. 357 Coaches could be given bonuses for
successful student academic performance, rather than won-lost records.
Athletes' dorms, cafeterias and special classes could be prohibited so that
student-athletes become better integrated with nonathlete students.
These regulations would be fully consistent with the antitrust laws.3 5 8
Moreover, application of the antitrust laws to the NCAA's amateurism
restrictions would free the NCAA from supervising its recruiting and fi-
nancial aid regulations and enable it to focus on what should be its true
mission - enhancing academic standards.
The application of the antitrust laws to the NCAA's amateurism re-
strictions will require some basic changes and create some practical diffi-
culties. Costs may increase and schools may need to develop new
revenue sources. Legislative modifications may be required. Neverthe-
less, the difficulties that will exist are not insurmountable and are more
than offset by the tangible and intangible benefits that adherence to the
rule of law would provide. A free market system with enhanced educa-
tional restrictions is economically sound and will go far toward cleaning
up major college athletics and restoring respect to our previously re-
vered institutions.
VI. Conclusion
Amateur athletics is a multi-million dollar industry in which its pri-
mary workers do not share in its rewards. Student-athletes are exploited
by schools that defend their regulations as preventing the commercializa-
tion of college sports. Major college sports, however, have long been
commercialized. Corporations sponsor bowl games, televison networks
dictate starting times and the status of coaches rises and falls with their
won-lost record. It is time that we recognize the NCAA's amateur rules
for what they are: a direct restraint on price competition. The NCAA
rules do not require amateurism, they require a limitation on pay. They
are a cost savings device. The NCAA invokes the shibboleth of amateur-
ism and the public and judiciary bob their heads. This is nonsense.
Careful analysis of the NCAA's justifications demonstrate that the heavy
courses and grades be listed would not greatly increase the burden to the university, but would
improve supervision. Perhaps enforcement could be further enhanced by permitting college athletes
to act as "private attorneys general" with a statute of limitations extending past graduation for ob-
jectively verifiable violations of the reporting requirement.
357 There is evidence that some student-athletes do not succeed academically because they are
not adequately prepared for university work. See REPORT No. 3, supra note 9, at 15-18. Coaches'
incentives to win cause some to overlook these deficiencies. By limiting affirmative action admis-
sions, some students may not get their choice of school, but they can get an education at a school
which is better suited to their academic needs.
This proposal potentially invites some additional academic fraud. Unsavory school administra-
tors may either doctor admission statistics or increase the number of nonqualified nonathletes ad-
mitted. This article would prefer to assume most schools would act scrupulously. If experience
demonstrated otherwise, this requirement could be modified or eliminated.
358 See supra notes 321-23 and accompanying text.
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burden to redeem a direct restraint on competition cannot be sustained.
The amateurism restrictions are not necessary to further any legitimate
interest. The NCAA is not a bad institution. Its members are not evil.
Their amateurism restrictions, however, are illegal.
Everyone cherishes the athletes of the world who, like Ernie Banks,
would love nothing more than to "play two." We prefer to believe ath-
letes play for the love of the game. There is something pure about that.
No one really believes this is true in major college athletics anymore. But
there is a feeling that if we pretend it is true, if we believe hard enough,
we can make it true. There would be nothing wrong with such self-delu-
sion if nobody were injured. That, however, is not the case. Athletes,
our schools, and ultimately all of society suffer. Students are deprived of
their just rewards; hypocrisy and immorality flourish. It is time to admit
the deception and apply the same laws to major college athletics that
apply to all other commercial enterprises. Allowing the free market to
operate will increase efficiency, and more importantly, provide a first step
toward cleaning up the scandal that plagues our universities' campuses.
True amateur athletics will not be eliminated. Many schools will choose
not to compete with the "power elite." They will insist that student-ath-
letes be students first. The major college programs, however, will be rec-
ognized for what they are and their student-athletes will be paid
accordingly. If problems develop, government intervention remains a
possibility. It is unlawful and inappropriate for schools, which may be
economically motivated, to impose direct restraints on competition to
cure speculative evils.
1990]
